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The Problem
What happens when we compare? We might say that comparison is an
act of the mind whereby two (or more) judgments are combined and
judged relatively to one another. Today it is cold, let us say three de-
grees above zero; yesterday it was cold too, perhaps three degrees below;
yesterday, then, was colder. Before we can make that comparative judg-
ment, certain means of comparison must be assured: a common theme
(temperature); criteria, possibly involving instruments or records; cat-
egories, such as “minimum” and “days”; a way of articulating the two
observations that will install a relation between them, for example that
of “more” and “less.”
The things compared do not, I think, contain comparison in them-
selves (an apple is redder only in relation to another apple, and the rela-
tionmust be perceived by someone or something); nonetheless, it would
be wrong to say that comparison exists merely in the mind. Compar-
isons, when thought, expressed in speech or acted on in myriad ways,
have effects in the world and among people; they can take the form of
actions, even of events; they quickly call up responses of fear, desire,
antagonism, pleasure, displeasure, and all the rest. These are my sub-
ject here. Leaving to the psychologists and philosophers the question of
what comparison is, I would like to ask: what does it do? What (besides
itself) does an act of comparison make happen?

The Unique, the Comparative and
the Competitive
Comparisons, we hear, are never innocent: but once scrutinized for
intent, can a comparison be classed as good, bad, or value‐neutral?1
Are there good or bad practices of comparing? What makes it risky?
Through a chain of examples, none of them, of course, innocently sum-
moned, but invoked for their potential to illuminate the consequences
of comparing and not comparing, I would like to discover what tends
to go wrong. I have (I blush to say) a normative idea of comparison,
and I will chase it here through examples positive and negative. If the
examples are adequate to the purpose, perhaps we can even determine
whether the fault lies with comparing itself or with the situations
wherein comparisons are made.
First, then, an example of non‐comparison. The Byzantine chron-
icler Theophanes tells a story of brief, unfortunate political‐religious
reform in the year 528.
The king of the Huns in the area around the [Cimmerian] Bosphorus,
Gordas by name, joined forces with the emperor [Justinian], became
a Christian, and was baptized; and the emperor received him, loaded
him up with many gifts, and sent him back to his own country, so that
hemight guard the Roman possessions and the city on the [Black Sea]
Bosphorus. […] So the king of the Huns, now a Christian, went back
1 For a wide‐ranging set of discussions, see Rita Felski and Susan Stanford Fried-
man, eds., Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 2013).
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to his own land and found his own brother and told him about the
emperor’s kindness and love of honor, and that he himself had be-
come a Christian; and taking the statues that the Huns worshiped,
he melted them down, for they were made of silver and electrum.2
The Huns grew angry and conspired with the brother, and rising up
they killed [Gordas], and then made the brother king under the name
Mouageris. Then, fearing that the Romans would find them out, they
went in stealth to the city of Bosphorus and killed the tribune Dalma-
tios and the generals.3
At this, the Romans sent out a stronger force and pacified the region
for the time being.
This is but one short episode in a year‐by-year listing of significant
events in the history of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire. The
Huns are one ofmany groups of outsiders who besiege the empire’s bor-
ders.Within those borders, theological controversies often rage. A zeal-
ous critic of Emperors Leo III and Constantine V for their “shameless
warring against the august, holy icons” (ἀναιδέστερον κατὰ τῶν ἁγίων
καὶ σεπτῶν εἰκόνων... πόλεμον)4,Theophanes often registers with satis-
faction the downfall of those who fail to honor images. Plagues,military
defeats, and civil unrest are regularly connected with the failure of the
bad emperors and their accomplices to give the icons proper reverence.
Given this overt endorsement of the power of icons on the nar-
rator’s part, it may seem surprising that the story of Gordas and the
Hunnish idols is not presented as a cautionary tale or exotic parallel. It
might seem to be a point in favor of the veneration of icons that this
chieftain who failed to show any respect to the images of his people
was eliminated, apparently without a dissenting voice, by supporters
2 According to John Malalas, whose account Theophanes is summarizing here, the
Hunnish godsweremelted down into Byzantine coin. See IoannesMalalas, Chrono-
graphia, ed. Ludwig Dindorf (Bonn: Weber, 1831), pp. 432, 646-47. The Cimmerian
Bosphorus was located in present‐day Crimea.
3 Theophanes [the Confessor], Chronographia, ed. Carl de Boor (2 vols., Leipzig: Teub-
ner, 1883-85), pp. 175-76.
4 Theophanes, Chronographia, p. 405.
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of the old‐time religion. But Theophanes is not interested in making
anything like that point. The murder of Gordas and his replacement by
Mouageris simply show the reprobate nature of the Huns, who in the
end meet with justified collective punishment. I cannot imagine that
Theophanes would welcome the suggestion that the Hunnish iconoclast
and the Byzantine iconomachs were examples of a more general cate-
gory or pointed to the same lesson. His universe of comparisons is too
narrow. Someone else might speculate that the destruction of icons,
violating some compact between the people and their gods, always pre-
cipitates a kind of constitutional crisis, but for Theophanes there is ap-
parently no such thing as images‐in-general, no “always.” There is no
category in relation to which Orthodox images, Hunnish images, Bud-
dhist images and so forth would be particular cases. Such a universaliz-
ing path is probably inconceivable for the chronicler because adducing
the two instances of image as cases of a general law would amount to
treating them identically, relativizing their differences, and that is sim-
ply unthinkable. There are on the one hand “the holy icons” and on the
other those contemptible idols, and what happens in reference to one
set is never the same as what happens with the other set.
A series of attitudes about image‐worship can be extracted from
Theophanes’s chronicle. There are (1) those who give due reverence to
the holy icons; there are (2) those who fail to revere them, some of them
within the empire, like Leo X; there are (3) those opposed to all images,
who trouble the empire from without (the Arabs); and finally there are
(4) those who revere things that are not the holy icons (idolators). But
these characterizations emerge piecemeal. No attempt is made in the
chronicle to draw these categories together, to analyze them, to work
out what relations of similarity or causality might obtain among them.
Evidently, Theophanes’s history is a history of the tribe. Its attachment
to one set of images is non‐negotiable, non‐transferable. There is for
it no point worth making about icons as a subset of images, or about
Byzantium as one of a set of theological‐political constitutions in which
images play a leading role.We can say that his is a history that excludes
comparison.
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But to speak in this way is to assume that comparison was always
possible, that for someone like Theophanes it would have been possible
to draw the parallels between Hun and Byzantine. Is this assumption
justified? Might it not be rather that we create criteria of similarity in
the act of noticing Theophanes’s myopia about images‐in-general? If
that is so, comparison is not inevitable, nor self‐evident. It reposes on
a set of conditions—conditions that were not met when Theophanes
wrote the page just cited.
In describing Theophanes’s worldview as narrow, bigoted, and thus
closed to comparison, I may be only stating the obvious. Lest it appear
that comparison is intrinsically open‐minded and universalizing, and
in order to reveal a certain other kind of need that comparative argu-
ments can fulfill, consider a widely‐circulated clip from Dan Murdoch’s
2015 documentary film, “KKK: The Fight for White Supremacy.” In it we
see a father and son, both robed and hooded in the gear of the Loyal
White Knights faction of the Klan.The father raises a hand and shouts,
“White Power!” echoed by the four‐year-old son: “White Paya!” Asked by
the British interviewer why he dressed his little boy up in Klan clothes,
the father, with no particular anger in his tone—only a bit of defen-
siveness, as if he were accounting for the choice to have his son play
soccer rather than baseball in a town where most of the kids play base-
ball—explains, “I just want my kid to know that it’s okay to be proud of
who he is. And if being proud of his heritage makes him a racist, well,
I’ll teach him to be a racist, you know? […] [The purpose is to help him]
to go through what he has to go through to become who he needs to
be in life.”5 The father’s motive (his public rationalization, anyway) for
inculcating in his son the view that (as he says) whites are “supreme”
and “God’s chosen people” takes the form of a comparison. “It’s okay
to be proud of who he is” echoes the language used by every advocacy
group in the United States: if you are Asian, or Native American, or gay,
or a Mensa member, or a cancer survivor, or a coal miner’s daughter,
5 Dan Murdoch, KKK: The Fight for White Supremacy (London: British Broadcasting
Company, 2015). The brief episode here described was often linked to in my social
media feed during the race agitations of 2018.
The Unique, the Comparative and the Competitive 13
you have every right to be “proud of your heritage,” so why not extend
the same permission to white people? To do otherwise, goes the argu-
ment, would be to impede the child’s natural growth into “who he needs
to be in life.” Latinos, African Americans, Chinese, transsexuals, and so
forth all have this wonderful thing called “Pride”— recognition of one’s
group membership and the approval that goes with it; a yearly parade;
the sympathy of the public. Why then is “Pride” denied to one group in
particular? Suppose that in a certain town there are five high schools of
equivalent size and reputation, each school having its team and mas-
cot: the Panthers, the Leopards, the Eagles, and so on. Each team is
followed around by a cheerleading squad (“Louder, Leopards!”), except
for the Polar Bears, to whom this vital resource is denied. Who could
fail to see the injustice done to the Polar Bears? Apparently implying just
such a scenario, the Klansman presents himself as supporting a general
principle of fairness. And given that fairness is a massively uncontro-
versial virtue in the United States (one never hears there the complaint
that a court decision is “too fair,” only perhaps that it “doesn’t take into
account particular circumstances”), he can then, having taken up posi-
tion on that secure rock, advance to a more controversial label for his
advocacy: if you dare call his attachment to fairness “racism,” well, he
will accept the label, because in the context of the greater issue it no
longer carries a negative implication for him. Washed in the pure wa-
ters of formal equivalence, “white power” becomes nothing more than
a local form of the ambient self‐esteem cult, translating into the terms
of whiteness such affirmations as “girl power” or “each of us is special.”
The interviewer, chiefly concerned to document the existence of
people like the Klan father and son, does not tarry with the semantics
in play, though it would have been interesting to see how the Klan
members gathering for a rally in the background would establish
the grounds of equivalence whereupon whiteness, in the US, can be
presented as just another identity. That is: an identity, and not a status
dependent on the mass of interlocking institutions that sustain the
ability of the white plurality to exclude or oppress others not so fa-
vored—exclusions and oppressions that, as it turns out, stimulated the
rise of the identity movements that the Klan father finds so vexingly
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enviable. After all, monopolists too ask for nothing more than the right
to participate in the free market—as monopolists of course. It is only
by being phrased in comparative terms, and only by detaching those
terms from historical or experiential content, that the slogan “white
power” can aspire to be recognized as a demand for fair treatment.
Since history is a tiresome, easily forgotten subject, and since other
people’s perspectives are beside the point when it is a matter of “be-
coming who you need to be,” the operation is quickly performed, and
for the Klan father and son perhaps definitively, since the whole point
of being a Klansman is to avoid the company of people who would
insist on parsing “white power” for its actual implications.
I surmise that this Klansman has also become aware of a creep-
ing habit in American speech of preceding one’s opinion on whatever
subject with a statement of community membership.6 “As a Huguenot-
American, I…” The shared identity takes the place of a demonstration
of facts and reasons; it is, apparently, itself the facts and reason for
one’s speech. Disturbing for grammarians but an even stronger proof
of the gambit’s implied justificatory power is the construction which
omits the “I think” or “I want to say that” clause: “As a trans person, the
Chicago School District has committed a massive injustice in closing
this school.” Left aside is the question, do all wearers of a label think
alike? And is the opinion expressed meant to be persuasive to members
of other communities as well, or is an assertion of community mem-
bership all that is required for the public use of reason? Whether the
purpose be to shore up the speech (many stand with me) or to deflect
possible criticism (my opinion being a facet of my identity, no one can
take it away from me), the tangle of self‐classification and self‐justifi-
cation must appeal to a felt interest of speakers. It also contributes to
fragmenting the public space where open comparison, not to mention
the debunking of nonsense, might happen.
6 For a discussion of the “azza clause” as a tic that “signals the urgent insecurity of
democratic culture and at the same time declares a temporary invulnerability and
a goal‐seeking purpose,” see David Simpson, Situatedness, or, Why We Keep Saying
WhereWe’re Coming From (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), pp. 41-47.
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Theophanes’s obtuseness and the Klansman’s sophistry alike bring
into view the question of the comparable. For the one, nothing is com-
parable (to the numinous icons); for the other, everything (every “iden-
tity”) is. Both speakers reduce history to the history of the tribe, but
the second one does so with an awareness of processes of rivalry and
legitimation that eludes the former. (It may be that the Klansman longs
to return to the splendid isolation of a Theophanes.) Theophanes im-
plies that the genuine, legitimate, charisma‐conferring MacGuffins are
uniquely possessed by his tribe; as there is no comparison, there can
be no question of being fair. The Klansman knows that he is living in a
complex society with many competing beliefs, many identities seeking
recognition, and his claim for special recognition is couched as com-
parison; he can get what he thinks of as his due only by putting forth
the assertion that others have received a good that he deserves no less
than they. He simply pretends not to understand the structure of the
relevant universe of comparisons. However hypocritical and deceptive
the Klansman’s claim, it does at least aver that he is living in a society
regulated by comparisons, a society in which it makes sense to appeal to
fairness as a decisive standard.
Theophanes, for his part, was not living in a multiconfessional state
where he would have had to face the question of dealing justly with
fellow citizens who worshiped differently. His lack of concern for com-
parison in the matter of the Huns’ idols corresponds to the unreceiv-
ability, for him, of a certain kind of claim about justice that has been
noted by citizens of secular or multiethnic states.The chronicle ofTheo-
phanes ticks forward, year by year, recording events and naming them
without needing to erase or replace any of the already given names. Its
categories are fixed. The fit between data acquisition and classification
is tight. The flexibility to modify categories is not required. A reader
who does not share those categories, a reader for whom the difference
between icons and idols is not unquestioned, appears as an unwanted
annoyance.
Flexibility, however, is amply on show in the Klansman’s sophism.
The case of “white power” as identity politics seems to be a category
mistake, a local malfunction of the comparative faculty—a wrong con-
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clusion derived from faulty data (since we know that the status “white”
has never in United States history been equivalent to, or interchange-
able with, any other status). But it is doubtful that a logician‐on-call
could fix it.
In both cases a privileged example defeated the process of compari-
son. As a consequence, general questions of causality, value, and consis-
tency—questions of judgment—were blocked. It seems then (reasoning
a negativo) that a good comparison must not only be accurate, it must
also be fair. The standards of both accuracy and fairness are hard to
specify in advance, and hard to satisfy as well. In what follows I will
examine a number of scenarios or situations of comparison, in order
to ask such questions as: What are the conditions that make compari-
son possible, desirable, impossible, undesirable, obligatory, or fraught?
What needs does comparison fulfill? Which is more challenging to ex-
plain, the ability to compare or the inability?
To “do justice” to a subject, as writers and researchers are supposed
to do, is no mere figure of speech. In neither of the cases just cited can
we say that justice was done. The difference between them can be ex-
pressed as that between obtuse and underhanded comparison. Obtuse-
ness denies comparability, underhandedness denies the incommensu-
rate (that is, the non‐common denominators, or whatever makes ex-
amples unlike each other). In their contrary ways, non‐comparison and
the underhanded comparison fall short of a standard of good compar-
ative practice. Although we usually say that the objects themselves can
or cannot be compared, this is nonsense; the point is that the act of
comparing, or of refusing to compare, raises our moral hackles. What
is the forum within which we do so? When testing for epistemic injus-
tice we must necessarily invoke a framework, a background, a horizon
that establishes the sorts of properties that justice would need to have.
One such framework has long been nationality. The example from
Theophanes shows how limiting that frame is. The Huns stood outside
the Eastern Roman state as enemies or wavering clients; no one inTheo-
phanes’s position would feel obliged to take their beliefs seriously. The
sophistical Klansman gestures vaguely at features of the liberal state as
realized in US legal culture (“freedom of speech,” “freedom of associa-
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tion,” “equal protection,” “pursuit of happiness”) and his language shows
some concern for public opinion as manifested in such a state (the ap-
peal to the hearer: “you know?”). In citizenly fashion, he is presenting
himself as a victim of the maldistribution of self‐esteem and as in need
of redress.7
In calling attention to the shortcomings of both the refusal to rec-
ognize comparability and the refusal to admit incomparability I, too,
am appealing to some regulative instance, perhaps one that is imag-
inary or under construction: the “world community,” the judgment of
history, the assembly of rational beings. (Or,with infinitelymore trivial-
ity though greater reality, my academic peers.) Whoever compares does
so against the background of a claim of justice, one that sketches out
a community as (potentially) capable of answering that demand. “Yes,”
that community might say, “we have reviewed the evidence and find the
comparanda comparable, therefore we pronounce what you said of the
first case also true (within limits) of the second case. Go then and per-
form the appropriate action: say a word, do a deed, join a side, enter
into a right or a resource, as the analogy of cases may direct.”
In societies made up of people who believe, act, speak and exist di-
versely, much is expected, then, from comparison. (A society without
dissent could not be a liberal society. To think in such a society would
mean, I suppose, to pile up perceptions in categories established by
7 As Asad Haider observes (and not in defense of liberalism), “When you can claim
to have been injured in some way on the basis of your identity, you can then
make an appeal to the state for protection. […] That’s the basic way that lib-
eral politics works. I rely on the insights of Judith Butler and Wendy Brown for
this. It means that not only do people get more and more reduced to what-
ever identity category has constituted them as political, because they were in-
jured on the basis of having that identity, it also takes away their agency as
political actors. Because they become victims who need to be protected by the
state.” Daniel Denvir, “Mistaking Identity Politics: An Interview with Asad Haider”
(posted August 14, 2018), available at https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3972-
mistaking‐identity-politics‐a-conversation‐with-asad‐haider-part‐i (accessed Oc-
tober 5, 2018). For a more fully referenced discussion of these points, see Haider,
Mistaken Identity: Race and Class in the Age of Trump (London: Verso, 2018), pp. 10-11,
105-07.
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consensus, continuing to register details but not modifying the frame-
work—exactly the style of the chronicle, by the way.) Comparison is part
of our daily moral life, a component of our on‐board navigation system,
one of many canaries we take down the mine. But can comparison do
what is seemingly expected of it? Can it adjudicate claims, by discov-
ering what is comparable and evaluating degrees of similarity? Does it
reckon with dissimilars and incompatibles, finding for them a basis on
which to associate and signify? Does it necessarily reduce, relativize,
trivialize, and if so, is that necessarily a bad thing? Is it capable of find-
ing out and defusing the sophistical abuses of its own logic? Does its
reach extend universally, as it would have to do if it were to have this
regulative function, or are there zones of exception in the generally con-
sented texture of comparison?
Reckoning with the Other
The era known complimentarily as the Age of Enlightenment identified
the “cosmopolitan perspective” and gave it great moral authority. Dis-
cussions of the legitimacy of comparison among cultures often go back
to this moment, interrogating it with a suspicion that sees in universal-
ism a fig leaf for dominance.1 But it is not all triumphant universalism:
some documents from that era testify to the anxiety provoked by inter-
cultural contact. Samuel Johnson, prefacing his great EnglishDictionary
of 1754, wrote to defend the boundaries of English:
The great pest of speech is frequency of translation. No book was ever
turned fromone language into another, without imparting something
of its native idiom; this is the most mischievous and comprehensive
innovation; single words may enter by thousands, and the fabrick of
the tongue continue the same, but new phraseology changes much
at once; it alters not the single stones of the building, but the order of
the columns. If an academy should be established for the cultivation of
our stile […] let them, instead of compiling grammars and dictionaries,
endeavor, with all their influence, to stop the license of translatours,
1 Pheng Cheah, “The Material World of Comparison,” pp. 523-45 in Felski and Fried-
man, eds., Comparison, examines Locke, Rousseau, and Smith in this spirit. On com-
parative literature’s resort to the ambivalent term “cosmopolitanism” (connoting
both universal empire and world peace) see Bruce Robbins, “What World History
Does World Literature Need?” 194-206 in May Hawas, ed., The Routledge Companion
toWorld Literature andWorld History (New York: Routledge, 2018).
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whose idleness and ignorance, if it be suffered to proceed, will reduce
us to babble a dialect of France.2
You might think that translating from French into English is a matter
of finding the English equivalents of each French word or statement—a
task made easier by the fact of centuries of steady interchange between
England and France. But no: the English words you use will be subtly
transformed in function and value by the French words they replace,
and the next time you use those English words, they will carry some
Frenchness into new English situations. Translation is, regrettably for
Johnson, a two‐way street. English is too close to French (and other lan-
guages) not to feel its distorting pressure. Is there, perhaps, no such
thing as English, or does it exist only as a by‐product of other lan-
guages? Johnson feels the ghostly interlinear foreignness of translated
books as a narcissistic wound, a violation of the boundary of English-
ness: a “pest of speech,” a bug, a parasite. Only a barrier or tariff against
licentious translators can guard against the danger of Britons becom-
ing subordinate to French linguistic mastery, the childish “babblers” of
a mere “dialect” whose proper, classical form is found in Paris. Is John-
son’s protectionist stance not perhaps designed to conjure away the sus-
picion that English itself may be no more than a parasite embedded in
a continental code?3
Edward Gibbon, writing in French in 1761 (and thus giving inciden-
tal proof that not everyone heeded Johnson’s directive), imagined the
effects of translating and reading documents from the Iroquois.
An Iroquoiswork, even if it were full of absurdities, would be an invalu-
able treasure; it would offer an unique specimen of the workings of
the human mind, when placed in circumstances which we have never
experienced, and influenced by manners and religious opinions en-
tirely contrary to our own.We should be sometimes astonished and in-
2 Samuel Johnson, “Preface to the Dictionary” (1755), in E. L. McAdam, Jr., and George
Milne, eds., Johnson’s Dictionary: A Modern Selection (New York: Pantheon, 1963), p.
27. Spelling conserved.
3 See Michel Serres, Le parasite (Paris: Grasset, 1980).
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structed by the contrariety of ideas thus produced […]We should there
learn not only to own, but to feel the power of prejudices, not to be as-
tonished atwhat seemsmost absurd, andoften to distrustwhat seems
best established.4
The man of the Enlightenment shows himself here fascinated by what
is not like him. His response is divided. He preemptively characterizes
the hypothetical Iroquois book as full of “absurdities,” as if to hold the
foreign book at a distance: we are the ones who know what the truth
is and the exotic informant is bound to be wrong about things. Well,
probably the Iroquois gets some things wrong; we all do. But once past
this easy assumption of epistemological superiority, Gibbon sets him-
self as reader a more demanding mission: to find the reasons behind
the “absurdities” of the text. Reddere rationem: it is a philosophical mis-
sion, to understand “the workings of the humanmind” in an unfamiliar
context. Gibbon does not promise to explain the Iroquois mentality in
terms of our ownmentality, but to discover, so far as possible, the coher-
ence, system, and implications of the alien mind. It is not our reasons
that count as Reason here. By performing this act of interpretation,
Gibbon advances, we will come to understand ourselves as “prejudiced”
subjects, to stand apart from our previous categories, and “to distrust
what seems best established” among people like ourselves.
This is what happens when we read texts composed under “circum-
stances which we have never experienced.” The texts puncture our ex-
isting world with seeming nonsense, just as the bastardized English of
translators violated, in Johnson’s view, the unity of the linguistic colon-
nade. Both kinds of disturbance offend against intellectual and cultural
narcissism, dispelling the illusion that we (or our culture) can account
for everything. What is the “Iroquois work”? Is it literature? Is it myth?
Is it the muttering of an insane person? Do we have a category for it?
Having a category would tell us what to do with it, how to comport our-
selves in reference to it, but that is exactly what is missing. Must we, or
4 Edward Gibbon, “An Essay on the Study of Literature” (1761), cited in Reiss, 136-37.
For the original, see Edward Gibbon, Essai sur l’étude de la littérature (London: Becket
& de Hondt, 1761), pp. 90-91.
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can we, adopt the document’s own categories for what it does, what it
contains, what it means, and what gods watch over the process?
Comparison as used by historians, anthropologists, literary schol-
ars, political scientists and other specialized professionals enacts pro-
cesses at work on a daily basis in language and culture: for example, the
loanword and the category failure.The encounter with foreign texts, the
lack of a conceptual scheme in which to class the new phenomenon,
force the observer to turn from the thing observed to the means of ob-
servation. All equivalence, translation and analogy assume some basis
of comparison as known. An everyday comparison holds constant its
starting terms, its “prejudices” Gibbon would say. Having heard a thou-
sand origin‐myths, I easily recognize a newmember of the set by its re-
semblance to the previous examples. But if I then encounter an aberrant
example, one where the gods do not behave like the gods in the myths I
know or the narrative links among events are inexplicable to me, I will
have to turn back on my categories and think about how they are con-
stituted. For that sort of operation, inventorying will be insufficient.
Reflexive comparison, as I would like to call this variety of thinking,
renegotiates its own logic as part of the act of comparing; it reconceives
the known in terms of the unknown (forcing us “to own […] the power of
prejudices”) rather than the more usual inverse. It is, as Kant said of a
similar case, a “power of judgment, which has no concept ready for the
given intuition.”5 “The reflecting power of judgment thus proceeds with
given appearances, in order to bring them under empirical concepts of
determinate natural things, not schematically, but technically, not as it
were merely mechanically, like an instrument, but artistically, in accor-
dance with [a] general but at the same time indeterminate principle.”6
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), “First Introduction,”
section viii, p. 26; Kant, “Erste Fassung der Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft,”
inWerke, ed. WilhelmWeischedel (6 vols., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge-
sellschaft, 1983), 5: 201.
6 Kant, trans. Guyer andMatthews,Critique of thePower of Judgment,p. 17; Kant,Werke,
5: 190.
Reckoning with the Other 23
Reflexive comparison is aesthetic judgment, because the suspension of
ready‐made categories and determinate judgment leaves us no choice.
(Privately, I call reflective and non‐reflective comparisons the
“smart” and “stupid” kinds, but I admit that this wording may not be
helpful.7 Still, at a time when more raw information is available to
more people than ever in human history, it is an astonishing para-
dox that so many of us take refuge from experience in hashtags and
other shorthand ways of signaling a lofty disregard for the details,
from “#mansplaining” to “#virtuesignaling,” from “#fakenews” and
“#deepstate” to “#neoliberalism,” “#elites.” If this is how humans behave
when performing what Kant calls “determinate judgment,” give me the
indeterminate, reflective kind.)
In the cultural sphere, encounters with the foreign must, if we are
alert to the fragility of our cognitive equipment, be aesthetic, an im-
provisation with sense‐data and incompletely identified principles. Any
degree of adventuring onto the terrain of foreignness will invite such
rethinking. If we ask “Was the enterprise of the Gracchi a revolution?”
we are partly asking for a characterization of those actions long ago (do
they satisfy our criteria for being a “revolution”?), and partly inviting a
judgment on our concept of “revolution,”whether its parts hold together
strongly or merely by the happenstance of our recent historical experi-
ence. Gibbon’s encounter with the imagined Iroquois text is a frustra-
tion of universal concepts and an invasion by a “contrariety of ideas.”
Cognition gives way to self‐cognition: why did I assume these features
of common sense?Would they seem plausible to me if I had been “influ-
enced by manners and religious opinions entirely contrary to our own”?
If I were not I, in other words, but someone else? Reflective judgment
about matters of culture ends up on the territory of the ethical. The
“artistic” dealing with otherness made possible by aesthetic‐reflective
7 The demand that comparisons not occur within a pre‐established scheme of value
is also found in R. Radhakrishnan, “Why Compare?” (in Felski and Friedman, eds.,
Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses, pp. 15-33) and David Bloor, Knowledge and So-
cial Imagery, second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
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judgment raises universality as a question rather than imposing it as a
solution.
Compare the confidence of Goethe in the famous conversation that
launched the term “Weltliteratur.” Johann Peter Eckermann reports in
January 1827:
I dined with Goethe. “Since I saw you,” said he, “I have read many and
various things, among which a Chinese novel has occupied and inter-
estedmemost of all.” – “A Chinese novel?” said I. “Thatmust seem very
strange.” – “Not somuch as youmight think,” said Goethe. “The people
there think, act, and feel almost exactly like us; andwe should feel per-
fect congeniality with them, if all they do were not more clear, more
pure and more decorous than with us.” 8
Eckermann expects a Chinese novel to be “strange,” fremdartig, but
Goethe reassures him: human nature is the same everywhere, only
its expressions vary in degree. The lesson for everyone dedicated to
the pursuit of literature is, says Goethe, that “poetry is the universal
possession of mankind,” and that “National literature is now rather an
unmeaning term; the epoch of World literature is at hand, and each
one must hasten its approach.” But no one should seek a pattern for
composition in the foreign and exotic; rather, “if we want examples, we
had best return to the ancient Greeks […] All the rest we must look at
historically” (p. 204). For Goethe in 1827 the mediating concepts were
all there: human nature, gradations of purity and decorum, intelligible
similes and legends; and the ancient Greeks furnish the touchstone of
universal artistic quality.
Although this passage, consecrated through frequent quotation, has
been taken as the charter for a comparative‐literature field known as
World Literature, I find Gibbon a better guide. Stable human nature,
the Greeks as timeless, universal standard of art, the quick dismissal of
8 Johann Peter Eckermann, Conversations with Goethe in the Last Years of his Life, trans.
Margaret Fuller (Boston:Hilliard, Gray andCompany, 1839), pp. 201-02. I havemade
some small changes to the wording of the translation.
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what is merely historical or anecdotal, that is, particular, in foreign pro-
ductions: with such preconceptions, the reader is in no danger of learn-
ing to value anything new.Why should we undertake comparison, if it is
only to tell us what we already know? The weakness of current projects
in world literature is that they assume rather than discover what lit-
erature is, what the world is, what connects the various phenomena
of both. That world is, of course, the globe as currently mapped, with
its networks of interchange and translation hinging on a few influen-
tial cities; literature is mainly the novel; similarity proves relationships;
bigger is better.9
Such assumptions guarantee tunnel vision. It is not enough to have
a theory and to assemble data. Nor is the goal to have a “powerful” the-
ory, one that explains all its data.10 A comparative project bears judging
for its scope, its categories, and its criteria. What is its scope (its uni-
verse, in statisticians’ jargon): How wide a field of phenomena does it
cover (howmanyworks, howmany centuries, howmany kinds of works,
in how many languages)? Non‐experts often suppose that Big Data will
automatically solve the problem of scope, but no data comes without
parsing, chunking, processing, and organization.11 Data exists in cate-
gories. As for categories: In attempting to make sense of its multifari-
ous givens, how does a project group and order them? Criteria: What is
noteworthy about the examples? On which of their features does the
9 I drastically and reductively paraphrase Franco Moretti, “Conjectures onWorld Lit-
erature,” New Left Review 1 (2000): 54-68, and “More Conjectures,” New Left Review
20 (2003): 73-81, to bring out the aspects that have met with the widest diffusion.
Moretti’s central claim, offered “as if it were a law of literary evolution: [that] in cul-
tures that belong to the periphery of the literary system […] the modern novel first
arises not as anautonomousdevelopmentbut as a compromisebetweenaWestern
formal influence […] and local materials” (“Conjectures,” p. 58), could be generated
analytically from the meanings he gives to “system,” “center,” “periphery,” “form,”
and “materials.” I hear as well in “local” an echo of Goethe’s eternal Greeks and in-
cidental foreigners.
10 As Moretti observes, “that a single explanation may work everywhere is both very
implausible and extraordinarily boring” (“More Conjectures,” p. 75).
11 See Lisa Gitelman, ed., “Raw Data” is an Oxymoron (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2013).
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comparison dwell? What does the comparison value? And finally, do
these aspects differ from the common practice (dissent being a good
thing in my view)? If one is doing research rather than inventory, a bit
of unpredictability is desirable: Could the present combination of the-
ory and data, with some adjustment, have led to different conclusions?
Comparisons are arguments, and arguments orient actions, large and
small, in the world. No less than the statement of single facts, and in-
deed rather more inextricably, comparisons can mislead.
World literature implies a world picture, a frame of reference.12 The
observer who is “tired of the old descriptions of the world”13 may see the
making and rectification of such a picture as the farther goal of “world
literature.”14 A practice of world literature that took reflective aesthetic
judgment for its model would begin by positing its world as one of
at least two worlds—in no sense the world, for “world” has no singular
except for a hypothetical omniscient observer. The panoptic and “un-
precedented possibility that the world may be subject to a single center
of power” (Moretti, “More Conjectures,” p. 81) that forms the post-Cold
War background to the recent raft of world‐literature projects nonethe-
less harbors spaces of dissent. (You are looking at one now.) History
contains variously organized worlds and networks. The literary world
experienced by the pre-ColumbianMayans, for example, must have had
its centers and peripheries, its forms and local variants, its canons, par-
odies, and detritus, and neither “the European novel” nor “the ancient
12 Martin Heidegger, “Die Zeit des Weltbildes,” 75-113 in Holzwege (Frankfurt am
Main: Klostermann, 1950) contends that modernity and the institution of a
“world picture” amount to the same thing. On the differences between 1938 and
1950 versions of this essay, a difference in “world pictures” indeed, see Sidonie
Kellerer, “Heideggers Maske. ‘Die Zeit des Weltbildes’ – Metamorphose eines
Textes,” Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte 5 (2011): 109-20.
13 Wallace Stevens, “The Latest Freed Man,” in Collected Poems (New York: Knopf,
1954), p. 204.
14 See Haun Saussy, “The Comparative History of East Asian Literatures: A Sort
of Manifesto,” Modern Languages Open 1 (2018), 20, available at https://www.
modernlanguagesopen.org/articles/10.3828/mlo.v0i0.206/; and “The Three Fu-
tures of World Literature,” Canadian Review of Comparative Literature / Revue cana-
dienne de littérature comparée 44 (2017): 397-406.
Reckoning with the Other 27
Greeks” had anything to contribute to it. Gaze on the polyglot Central
Asian library of Dunhuang, preserved by accident from the year 1000
or so, with its records of international haggling, rivalry, and proselytiz-
ing. Or the still barely read archives of cuneiform.15 It is not antiquarian
nostalgia that calls us to reconstruct these literary worlds, but a desire
to know what literature is in general, what a world is in general, and what
the combination of these two tends to yield.
Being “astonished and instructed” by foreignness, as Gibbon imag-
ines it, is a scene of aesthetic judgment. In Anglo-American academic
parlance at present, the word “aesthetic” is rich in connotations of
self‐interested hypocrisy: in the scenes it conjures up, the idle rich
pursue beauty as a touchstone of status, slamming an exquisitely
fashioned door on politics, economics, and the masses. Kant’s use of
the term aesthetic to indicate a mode of cognition without certainties,
in which we are forced to wield our wits “technically […] artistically”
in crafting provisional translations for things as yet without a name,
gets at the pragmatic (and thus, unavoidably ethical) results of con-
tact with the foreign. I have previously argued that the usefulness
of interdisciplinary research, particularly in comparative literature,
has always been not to extend existing disciplines over previously
unclaimed territory, but to provoke a kind of mismatch or backlash,
and a consequent rethinking. That praise of unpredictability has been
misunderstood as cheering for ignorance.16 There is a place for the
tried‐and-true, but piling up results is not the main value of com-
parative and interdisciplinary study; making discovery possible is, I
think.
15 “In spite of continued great interest in mankind’s earliest documents it has been
estimated that only about 1/10 of the extant cuneiform texts have been read even
once inmodern times.” LeeWatkins, Jr., andDean Snyder, “TheDigitalHammurabi
Project,” available at http://www.jhu.edu/digitalhammurabi/, (accessed Septem-
ber 10, 2017).
16 Jacob Edmond, Haun Saussy and David Damrosch, “Trying to Make It Real: An Ex-
change,” Comparative Literature Studies 53 (2016): 660-93.

The Family of Comparisons
What does comparison do—intellectually? Epistemic comparison is hy-
pothetical, inferential, a way of gathering evidence into constellations
promised to meaningfulness. If item X in context A resembles item N
in context B, is there an item Y in context A to which an item P corre-
sponds in context B? Are X and Y related in the same way as N and P?
If yes, if no, what are the consequences?
Although the Persians “have never believed the gods to be like men,
as the Greeks do,” says Herodotus, “they call the whole circuit of heaven
Zeus, and to him they sacrifice on the highest peaks of the mountains”;
they have also learned from the Assyrians and Arabians to sacrifice
to a Heavenly Woman (Οὐρανίη) whom the Greeks call Aphrodite, the
Assyrians Mylitta, the Arabians Alilat, and the Persians Mitra.1 Anal-
ogy serves Herodotus as a technique for exploring the unknown. As
if to say, “if they have a god who inhabits the sky and receives sacri-
fice on mountain tops, the name of that god must be Zeus,” a deity
Herodotus is more generous about sharing with the foreigners than his
successor a thousand years later, Theophanes. (The mountaintop deity
is said to be identical with Zeus, although the Persians according to
Herodotus “have never believed the gods to be like men”; so “Zeus” here
comes to name a function, a position, when similarity of appearance
falls short.) The pantheons of polytheism occasioned some of the first
sustained discussions of cultural comparability applied to the Greeks,
1 Herodotus, Histories, 1.131.
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Romans, Egyptians, Etruscans, Gauls, Persians, Indians, and other peo-
ples of the world known to (say) Strabo. Others occurred in the re-
lated field of legend, as when someone passing for Plutarch observed
that the ancient history of Rome is rife with parallels to Greek local
histories.2 What lies behind Herodotus’s guesswork—a common Indo-
European linguistic andmythological background on which Greeks and
Persians alike draw—would not be more fully painted in until the late
eighteenth century. Before announcing the far more renowned discov-
ery that Sanskrit, Persian, Latin and Greek must “have sprung from
some common source, which, perhaps, no longer exists,”3 Sir William
Jones had tried his hand at the ancient scholarly pastime of correlat-
ing the pantheons, proposing in a 1784 paper that “when features of
resemblance, too strong to have been accidental, are observable in dif-
ferent systems of polytheism, without fancy or prejudice to color them
and improve the likeness, we can scarce help believing that some con-
nection has immemorially subsisted between the several nations who
have adopted them.”4 The resemblances the comparatist advances must
be “too strong to have been accidental” and should not be of a kind that
“fancy or prejudice” could have artificially generated—advice that recalls
the law court’s approach to proof, for Jones was a judge by profession.
The preponderance of evidence is what counts. One or two similarities
prove little. Herodotus, in fact, is batting at the level of chance, with
one generally accepted identification (Zeus as a variant of the general
2 Pseudo-Plutarch, “Parallela minora,” in Moralia. No consequence is drawn there,
though much later Georges Dumézil would seize on exactly such parallels in leg-
endary history to assert the predominance of thought‐patterns attested in Indo-
European myth.
3 William Jones, “The Third Anniversary Discourse” (1786), in Asiatick Researches, or
Transactions of the Society Instituted inBengal 1 (1798): 443. Sheldon Pollock notes that
Siraj al-Din Ali KhanArzu had preceded Jones by about thirty years in observing the
concordance between Sanskrit and Persian. See Pollock, “Future Philology?” Critical
Inquiry 35 (2009): 931-61, p. 938.
4 William Jones, “On the Gods of Greece, Italy and India” (1784), Asiatic Researches 1:
221-75, p. 222.
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Indo-European sky father) and one miss (Herodotus gets Mitra’s gen-
der wrong and should rather have connected him to Hermes as patron
of exchange or Zeus as guarantor of oaths). A well‐formed comparative
demonstration involves many parallels and suggests a reason behind
them.
That reasonmay lie in the past.The logic of historical reconstruction
common to comparative mythology and comparative linguistics per-
mits the discovery (as Jones put it) of “some connection,” undocumented
as such in the records of a linguistically and culturally fragmented hu-
manity, that has “immemorially subsisted.” At about the same time that
Jones wrote about ancient India, comparative anatomy furnished zool-
ogy with similar inferences. Georges Cuvier, working in the preserved
animal collections of the Jardin des Plantes in Paris, found that despite
their manifest differences (no one could confuse a whale and a mouse),
the animals of the world were as if variations on a single theme. In his
Leçons d’anatomie comparée (1800-1805), Cuvier modified the static and
hierarchical classifications of the animal world with a vast comparative
argument. Awhale’s skeleton, subjected to a certain set of regular trans-
formations, could turn into an elephant’s or a mouse’s skeleton. Nature
became a unitary spectacle, a proportional demonstration of the mu-
tual convertibility of species.The evidence filled room after room in the
Muséum national d’histoire naturelle; the savants and curious flocked
to hear his demonstrations. The meaning of “comparative” in Cuvier’s
usage came down to laws of coherence and of totality.
In the living state, the organs are not only next to one another, but […]
act on one another, and contribute together to a common end. For this
reason, should any of the organs undergo amodification, its influence
will extend to all the others. Those modifications that cannot coexist
rule one another out; othermodifications demand their counterparts,
so to speak, not only in organs that are in immediate contact with one
another but even in those that at first glance appear to bemost distant
and independent from one another. […]
No bone can vary in its facets, in its curvature, or in its protruber-
ances, without the others undergoing proportionate variations; and it
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is possible to derive from the observation of a single bone conclusions
about the whole of the skeleton.5
Cuvier offered a synoptic view of the whole animal kingdom, from
which random or mechanical variation was absent. Every bone of every
vertebrate animal was related to every bone of every other vertebrate,
by proportion and analogy. No species was an island.
Friedrich Schlegel claimed something similar for languages: “This
decisive point [namely, the priority of Sanskrit over Greek and other Eu-
ropean idioms] is clarified by the inner structure of languages or com-
parative grammar, which is to give us entirely new conclusions on the
genealogy of languages in the same way that comparative anatomy has
cast light on higher natural history.”6 Schlegel’s comparison between
two comparative sciences was only a promise of future results. A more
fully realized Vergleichende Grammatik drawing on seven Indo-European
languages would appear in 1833-52, compiled by Franz Bopp. Although
Bopp and Schlegel could hardly be less alike in their literary personali-
ties and cultural commitments, the recurrence of the title phrase evokes
the epistemic power of Cuvier’s arguments for the analogy among dif-
ferent animal bodies, which had already become part of the common
awareness of educated people.7 One can imagine that Bopp’s tables of
5 Georges Cuvier, Leçons d’anatomie comparée (Paris, 1800), vol. 1, pp. 46, 56-57. For a
detailed study of the debt of historical linguistics to Cuvier’s epistemology, see Guy
Jucquois, Le comparatisme: émergence d’une méthode (Louvain: Peeters, 1993), and for
a recent invocation of Cuvier as a pattern for historical research, see Carlo Ginzburg,
“Medals and Shells: On Morphology and History, Once Again,” Critical Inquiry 45
(2019): 380-95. Cuvier was not alone. See GordonMcOuat, “Cataloguing Power: De-
lineating ‘Competent Naturalists’ and the Meaning of Species in the British Mu-
seum,” British Journal for the History of Science 34 (2001): 1-28.
6 Friedrich Schlegel, Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier (Heidelberg, 1808), p.
28, cited in Konrad Koerner, Practicing Linguistic Historiography (Amsterdam: Ben-
jamins, 1989), p. 276. Koerner shows that Schlegel, while studying Sanskrit in Paris,
requested a letter of recommendation from Cuvier.
7 On divergences between Schlegel and Bopp, see “Introduction: Ignoring Saussure,”
in David L. Hoyt and KarenOslund, eds., The Study of Language and the Politics of Com-
munity in Global Context, 1740-1940 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield,
2006), pp. 12-13.
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parallel forms in the Indo-European languages were read similarly to
Cuvier’s copperplate engravings.The place of a consonant in a word was
analogous to the place of a bone in the body of an animal: as the species
differed, so the languages differed, but among the parts of each could be
observed certain constant proportions and regular deformations. Com-
parison and comparability belonged to the intelligible structure of the
world; indeed they made it intelligible.
Schlegel’s attempt to trade on the reputation of comparative
anatomy for rigor and consequentiality overstepped the boundaries
of Cuvier’s science, a descriptive and classificatory discipline that
ventured no hypotheses about unobservable history. More conspicuous
in the public eye, better at securing institutional support than Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Cuvier gave as little room
as possible to explanation of the relatedness of similar phenomena.
He was a believer in the fixity of species.8 The origin of the elephant
was the elephant. Yet God had shaped the elephant on a pattern shared
with every other vertebrate animal. The reasons behind that pattern
must remain a mystery. Cuvier’s marvelous descriptions simply de-
scribed species after species, specimen after specimen.They amounted
to a morphology: an analysis and correlation of parts. But Schlegel,
captivated by the implications of Sanskrit, promised something more:
“a genealogy of languages.” Unlike species, languages were historical
and their changes could be observed. Linguistic comparison discov-
ered not just similarities and proportions, as Cuvier’s morphologies
had done, but enabled a search for the “connections” (Jones again)
“that had immemorially subsisted among” similar forms. “Laws” of
phonetic change permitted generalization, reconstruction, and extrap-
olation, explaining how languages in the same family differed from
one another and from a common proto‐language. As natural‐history
methods and metaphors were reworked into historical linguistics, the
8 On the latent tension between functional and evolutionary explanations in French
biology of the time, see Valerie Racine, “The Cuvier-Geoffroy Debate” (2013), in Em-
bryo Project Encyclopedia (online resource, dated 7 October 2013), available at http://
embryo.asu.edu/pages/essay‐cuvier-geoffroy‐debate.
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adjective “comparative” changed in meaning. Analogy pointed back to
history; history justified analogy—cleared it of the suspicion of “fancy
or prejudice,” gave it something to be about.9
Morphology produces anatomies and classifications. Building on
morphology, derivation establishes grades of likeness and nominates
ancestors on the grounds of shared traits: it draws family trees.10 Be-
fore Darwin showed that species, too, were historical, linguistics en-
larged the human family by showing, for example, that the genius of the
French language is not unique to France, French people, or Frenchness,
but is shared, in some high percentage, with German, English, Irish,
Persian, Latvian and Bengali.Through comparative practices in linguis-
tics, archaeology, ethnography, religious history, and above all through
scholarly investigation, translation, and imaginary investment in the
“Orient,” the range of available cultural knowledge widened.11 Ernest
Renan did not hesitate to measure that widening in units of “worlds”:
Ever since the fifteenth century the sciences having for their object
the human intellect and its works have made no discovery to be com-
pared to that which has revealed to us in India an intellectual world of
marvellous wealth, variety and depth, in aword, another Europe. If we
review our most settled ideas in comparative literature, in linguistic
knowledge, in ethnography, in criticism we shall find them stamped
and modified by this grand and capital discovery12
—namely the philological discovery of India by Jones, Schlegel and
Bopp. “We must consider the revolution philology has wrought […] And
9 See Devin Griffiths, The Age of Analogy: Science and Literature Between the Darwins
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016).
10 The first such tree of language relationships was drawn by Bopp’s student August
Schleicher after reading Darwin’sOrigin of Species. See Robert J. Richards, “The Lin-
guistic Origin ofMan: August Schleicher and theMissing Link in Evolutionary The-
ory,” 159-91 in Richards, Was Hitler a Darwinian? Disputed Questions in the History of
Evolutionary Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).
11 See Raymond Schwab, La renaissance orientale (Paris: Payot, 1950).
12 Ernest Renan, The Future of Science: Ideas of 1848 (L’Avenir de la science, 1890; Eng.
trans. Albert D. Vandam and C. B. Pitman, 1891), p. 127.
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it seems to me that […] the most important revolutions of thought have
been brought about by those men whom we should call littérateurs
or philologists.”13 Philology revealed the foreignness of many foreign
languages to be only superficial, at the same time as the development
of new means of transport, weapons, and articles of commerce eroded
the borders of nations. Language families took on flesh, becoming
ethnicities.These “spectres of comparison” moved about history, claim-
ing agency, taking credit or blame.14 This was yet another new thing
that comparison made happen. Sanskrit and its kindred languages
could now be seen to reach from Iceland to Java and Kamchatka, not
to mention North and South America, a condition celebrated by the
Yale Sanskritist William Dwight Whitney, a student of Bopp. Whitney
exulted in “the last and grandest era of Indo-European supremacy,”
“the era in the midst of which we now live.”
One source of the special interest which we feel in the study of Indo-
European language lies in the fact that our own tongue is one of its
branches. […] Butweare further justified inour somewhat exclusive in-
terest by the position which our languages, and the races which speak
them, hold among other languages and races. […] For the past few cen-
turies, the European nations have stood foremost, without a rival, in
the world’s history. They are the enlightened and the enlighteners of
mankind. […] The network of their ability embraces the globe; their
ships are in every sea between the poles, for exploration, for trade, or
for conquest; the weaker races are learning their civilization, falling
under their authority, or perishing off the face of the land, from in-
herent inability to stand before them. […] They have inherited from
its ancient possessors the sceptre of universal dominion […] and they
are worthy to hold it, since their sway brings, upon the whole, physical
13 Renan, The Future of Science, p. 133.
14 The phrase, from José Rizal’s 1887 novelNoli me tangere, serves as title and leitmo-
tif of Benedict Anderson’s book of essays The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism,
Southeast Asia, and the World (London: Verso, 1998). I use it here to antedate the
relation of comparison to fantasized collectivities.
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well‐being, knowledge, morality and religion to those over whom it is
extended.15
Comparison did well enough as a means of world‐enlargement when it
was amatter of recovering “the immemorial connections” among the fa-
vored race. But when it extended to “the weaker races,” comparison be-
came, like certain kinds of marriage in certain states once upon a time,
illegitimate. Maurice Olender narrates the expansion and contraction
of the comparative model, enlarging Europe only to solidify the outer
fortifications of the new construct.16 Or as Marcel Detienne puts it in a
few words:
The science of civilizations, it seemed, portended a discipline that
would be the common ground of both historians and anthropologists
[…] But in short order came the classification of cultures by a com-
parison of values, on a scale leading from the most primitive to the
most highly evolved[…]. And presently the ancient societies of the
Greco-Roman world, with Athens as world capital, were pronounced
forbidden territory for comparativism. A “one‐way street.”17
Indeed the worry that comparative genealogies might go too far had in-
spired a hesitation early on in Jones’s 1784 essay on mythology. Jones’s
demonstration of mythological relatedness between India and Greece
was fenced around by disclaimers: these findings applied only to the
pagan pantheons, and although “some intelligent and virtuous persons
are inclined to doubt the authenticity of the accounts delivered byMoses
concerning the primitive world,” a flaw in “the fabric of our national
religion” is “a conclusion which, I trust, none of us should wish to be
15 William Dwight Whitney, Language and the Science of Language (New York: Charles
Scribner & Company, 1868), pp. 230-32.
16 Maurice Olender, Les langues du Paradis: Aryens et Sémites, un couple providentiel
(Paris: Gallimard-Le Seuil, 1989). “The hypothesis of an Indo-European family of
languages was a discursive retreat from the universalism of the Enlightenment
[…] ultimately it was a science of the Aryan clan” (Hoyt and Oslund, “Introduction:
Ignoring Saussure,” p. 14).
17 Marcel Detienne, Comparer l’incomparable (Paris: Seuil, 2000), p. 24.
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drawn.”18 Like his predecessor Vico, whose New Science bore only on
the history of peoples outside the light of Revelation, Jones was careful
to shelter the “national religion” from degrading comparisons. (With-
out, let it be said in this case, racial animus: Jones is sheltering Moses
and his Christian interpreters from potentially invidious comparisons
with rival Indic and Greek accounts of the creation of the world.) Thus
amidst the ambitious comparisons of Enlightenment and romantic ori-
ental study, a note of incomparability is struck.
Producing family trees and common ancestors, historical recon-
struction founds a tribe. That is its goal and its limit. It has nothing
to say about those outside the fold; for them, new starting points and
parentages must be constructed. And it can artificially create outsiders
by manipulating the terms of comparison. Cuvier, whose lessons and
illustrations showed the lawlike uniformity of the entire animal king-
dom, sheltered Europeans from too close kinship with Africans by en-
closing the latter in a distinct type or species. Plate III of his Tableau
élémentaire de l’histoire naturelle des animaux, captioned “Têtes des mam-
mifères,” depicts the skulls of a cat, a dog, a hedgehog, a baboon, an
orangutan, a “European” and a “Negro” side by side, as if the ontological
distances among these “species” were equivalent.19 Kant, regrettably,
exempted Africans from the duties and protections of the Categorical
Imperative.20 And Renan, after a youth spent spreading the tapestry of
German philology to cover the major cultures of the ancient world (“I
18 Jones, “On the Gods of Greece, Italy and India,” p. 225.
19 Georges Cuvier, Tableau élémentaire de l’histoire naturelle des animaux (Paris: Bau-
douin, an 6), planche III.
20 See for example Léon Poliakov, “Racism from the Enlightenment to the Age of Im-
perialism,” 55-64 in Robert Ross, ed., Racism and Colonialism: Essays on Ideology and
Social Structure (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982). A good survey including the earlier
commentary literature is Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race,”
ThePhilosophicalQuarterly 57 (2007): 573-92. The shift in Kant’s opinion onAfricans
and Native Americans, from denying them full membership in humanity to in-
cluding themundermoral universals, comes, according to Kleingeld, shortly after
1792. Might the shift have been a response to reports of the revolt of the slaves of
Santo Domingo (begun 1792) that resulted in Haitian independence (1804)?
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am under the impression that the comparative study of the different
literatures has afforded me a much wider idea of human nature than
that generally conceived. No doubt there is a good deal that is univer-
sal”), conceded in 1890 that his early work lacked “a sufficiently clear
perception of the inequality of races.”21 Whitney had that “sufficiently
clear perception,” alas, and it shows in his judgment of the colonial or-
der of his time as the honor and glory of the Indo-European ethnicity.
We can in turn issue a verdict on such models of historical comparison.
Comparisons designed to establish common descent risk being myopic
(rather in the style of Theophanes); those that stake a claim to superior-
ity are invidious (conscious of rivals and resentful of them). Myopic and
invidious comparisons use the forms of analogy to suspend compari-
son, to craft islands of incomparability.The two modes of failure do not
by any means exclude one another: when Cuvier or Kant relegate mil-
lions of their fellow‐beings to a subhuman category, they exhibit both
myopia and invidiousness. Their decision to do so cannot be entirely
blamed on the times. Many of their contemporaries would have argued
that the bounds of our sympathy and interest, to use language they
might have employed, should not be so narrow.22
21 Renan, The Future of Science, pp. 163, xix. Renan is of course alluding to the work
of Arthur de Gobineau, Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (Paris: Didot, 1853),
and surely ignoring the rebuttal by Anténor Firmin, De l’égalité des races humaines:
anthropologie positive (1885; reprinted, Montréal: Mémoire d’encre, 2005).
22 On these two poles of reflection in Smith, see Gloria Zúñiga y Postigo, “Adam
Smith on Sympathy: From Self-Interest to Empathy,” 136-46 in David F. Hardwick
and Leslie Marsh, eds., Propriety and Prosperity: Archival Insights into the Evolution of
Economics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
The Elasticity of Substitution
Within the gates of the University, comparison has an uneven reputa-
tion. Benedetto Croce refused the title of “field of study” to comparative
literature on the grounds that comparison is a mere analytic mecha-
nism common to all disciplines; the literary scholar should aim rather at
the nobler goal of “historical‐aesthetic synthesis.”1 If Walther Rathenau
held that “Denken heißt vergleichen” (to think is to compare)2, MaxWe-
ber was just as persuaded that “the individual can acquire the sure con-
sciousness of achieving something truly perfect in the field of science
only in case he is a strict specialist[…]. A really definitive andworthwhile
achievement is nowadays always a specialized achievement.”3 Themost
that comparison or interdisciplinary chit‐chat can do, in Weber’s opin-
ion, is suggest questions that specialists will investigate responsibly.
These critiques make comparison out to be something optional or in-
significant. The comparative mythographer Bruce Lincoln’s concern is
rather with
processes of decontextualization and exploitation. When scholars
treat the complex products of another society’s imaginative labors as
the raw materials from which they confect their theories, and when
they regard their theories as an intellectual product of a higher order
1 Benedetto Croce, “Varietà: La ‘Letteratura comparata’,” La Critica 1 (1903), 77-80.
2 Walther Rathenau, Auf dem Fechtboden des Geistes. Aphorismen aus seinen Notizbüch-
ern, ed. Karl G. Walther (Wiesbaden: Der Greif, 1953), p. 71; now rendered in mural
tile at the Rathenauplatz subway station, Nuremberg.
3 Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation” (1917), in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds.,
FromMaxWeber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 134.
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than that of the materials they extracted, grievous abuses have been
committed.
–Valuablegoodshavebeenappropriated, oftenby thosewhohave
little claim to or investment in them.
– The makers of those goods have been recognized and compen-
sated, if at all, in very inadequate fashion.
– Sign‐values have displaced use‐values as items of discourse and
practice that actively shaped people's lives are transformed into ‘com-
paranda’ and ‘examples.’
– As examples accumulate, they are treatedwith increasing super-
ficiality and inattention to whatever aspects (all of which had import
in their original context) fail to support the comparatist’s point.4
Lincoln’s reproach puts the blame on acts of intellectual exploita-
tion through comparing: appropriation, trivialization. No doubt that
“comparison is historiographically and methodologically problematic
[…] also charged politically.”5 But it is no less true that the refusal
to countenance comparison can perform the opposite kind of injury,
by perpetuating privilege. Marcel Detienne’s Comparer l’incomparable
responds to one such case. A historian and a Hellenist, Detienne was
attracted, in the rosy dawn of structuralism, to the inherently com-
parative discipline of anthropology and then found himself shunned
as having entered into a mésalliance. Detienne found over the years
that collective research proposals involving the comparison of widely
divergent societies, with different modes of social organization, liv-
ing in different times, on different continents, met with little favor
4 Bruce Lincoln, Apples andOranges: Explorations In,On, andWith Comparison (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2018), p. 9. Similar misgivings are voiced by Rita Fel-
ski and Susan Stanford Friedman in the introduction to Comparison: Theories, Ap-
proaches, Uses. For a normative account of the usefulness of comparison and varia-
tion in history, economics, and sociology, see John Gerring, “Causation: A Unified
Framework for the Social Sciences,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 17 (2005): 163-98,
esp. pp. 184-89 and note 26.
5 Ann Laura Stoler, “Preface to the 2010 Edition,” Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power:
Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule, second edition (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 2010), p. xiii.
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among the arch‐druids of the profession. Comparer l’incomparable is his
counter‐attack. Its shafts are directed, with a startling lack of team
spirit, at the sorts of historians and Hellenists most likely to occupy
the summits of their professions in France. Detienne contends that
the eminent colleagues seated or standing upon those distinguished
chairs have bartered intellectual integrity for the courtier’s currency,
influence. What this means is both intra‐professional influence (the
ability to get jobs for your students and money for your research
projects) and the kind of clout that public intellectuals can wield (a
reputation for wisdom and relevance that will ensure that Le Monde or
L’Express will call you for a quote the next time there is a need to run
an article about the crisis of Europe or the politics of memory, and for
a few top‐ranked players, a role as ministerial or presidential advisor).
The entry fee for such public recognition is a willingness to pay homage
to the myth of national uniqueness—the eternal question of French
identity, always to be answered in the affirmative—and beyond that to
the myth of European uniqueness, itself rooted in a story that tells how
the Greek miracle of reason and democracy, created simultaneously
with classical art and literature, was in a secret formula mysteriously
carried through the ages to flower again in the democracies of the
modern West.
If Greece has been declared “incomparable,” it was under the pressure
of our national patriots eager to claim ownership of the heritage of
Plato andHomer—and that of theWest to boot. […] ComparingGreeks
with Greeks not only annoys nobody, but coincides with the interest of
historians who are naturally lovers of the Nation and strict observers
of disciplinary lines. Yes, honor the institution, salute the customs of-
ficers, show the right passport, and everything else will come besides:
professional recognition, decorations, membership in honorary soci-
eties, knighthoods. Quite a dizzying prospect, for a barely noticeable
abdication.6
6 Detienne,Comparer l’incomparable, pp. 12-13. Translationmine. Theproximate cause
of Detienne’s bitterness on the subject is the failure of a proposed chair in “Com-
parative Anthropology of Ancient Greece” at the Collège de France in 1992, submit-
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These two fictions prevail across dividing lines of Left and Right (among
the colleagues Detienne mentions one finds both loyal communists and
loyal Gaullists) and across centuries of social change. Since they are
identitarian constructs, they are not easily questioned by those who
have a stake in maintaining those identities; and in order to prevent
such questioning, Detienne contends, they have been fenced around
with the primordial prohibitions, Thou shalt not compare other societies
with the Athenian Greeks; thou shalt not analyze the unique properties
of the national soul. Or as the prohibition is usually expressed: “one
must compare only what is comparable.” Legitimate historians com-
pare, if they are in an adventurous mood, England during the reign
of Charles the First with France in the reign of Louis XIII, the paral-
lel stages of German and Italian unification, Stalin’s and Franco’s re-
sponses to falling birthrates—that sort of thing, the comparability of
the cases being guaranteed by a large cushion of sameness. Where the
similarities between two things are not obvious (that is: consented, ce-
mented by precedent, amatter of common sense), comparison becomes
questionable. But it is precisely the non‐obvious kind of comparison
that can serve as a means of discovery unavailable to the Weberian spe-
cialist.
Like common sense in Descartes’ humorous prologue, incompara-
bility is of all things the most well‐distributed, for rare are the cul-
tures that have not classified themselves as unique. (Incommensurabil-
ity, a concept whose history in cultural studies is well worth tracing,
has sometimes served to express this desire on behalf of populations
in fear of being compared out of existence.) If the modern Europeans
were the only ones suffering from this form of injured narcissism, we
could content ourselves with demolishing Eurocentrism. But we know
that the symptom is rather more widely distributed.
ted by Yves Bonnefoy, for which Detienne was the nominee. See Pascale Rabault-
Feuerhahn, “La comparaison fait‐elle la discipline? Intitulés comparatistes et dy-
namique des chaires au Collège de France,” 383-434 inWolf Feuerhahn, ed., La poli-
tique des chaires au Collège de France (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2017).
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In his ill‐omened matchmaking among disciplines, Detienne advo-
cates not case‐by-case comparison but rather “experimenting” with the
materials, “manipulations… [that] put into contact and cause reactions
among phenomena or configurations that are never repeated in their
entirety during the course of history… so as to reveal the transforma-
tions of some of the elements that go into these phenomena and config-
urations.” “What are the ‘comparables’ between historians and anthro-
pologists?” he asks.
They are not themes […] but mechanisms of thought that may be ob-
served in the articulations among the elements brought into relation.
[…] In this constructive (as you see) comparatism, the “comparables”
are not types whereby to establish a typology [of acts of founding] ac-
cording to, let’s say, whether the founders are hunters, ramblers, cau-
tious, impetuous, etc. Nor are they formswherewith to build up amor-
phology of territories or dwellings […] The “comparables” are the sur-
faces of linkage [plaques d’enchaînement] that have been determined by
a choice, an initial choice. Historians and anthropologists, habituated
to working together, give priority to assemblages that proceed from
neighboring but different logical choices.7
Detienne knows very well that proceeding in this way will disturb
both historians and anthropologists: the historians because context
and causality are disregarded, and the anthropologists (at least those
of a certain functionalist stripe) because to do so violates cultural
integrity, the idea that an element gains its meaning from its place
in a system. Systems break down all the time in the normal course of
history. Evolving cultures, or comparatists in a hurry, can also break
a narrative into pieces, the better to combine those pieces with the
shards of a different culture’s narrative. Thus for example the act of
“founding” in Greek history and legend, which may contain a great
many thematic features obligatorily linked together by the investments
of that culture—the founding hero, the drawing of boundaries, a sac-
rifice as part of the new beginning, an oath, the presence of strangers,
7 Detienne, Comparer l’incomparable, pp. 103, 51-52.
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etc.—becomes just one of many combinations of possibility when put
alongside founding acts in other histories that articulate different sets
of components under a different body of rules.The category then opens
up and no longer has a classic example or statutory definition. The
comparison has achieved commensurability (not interchangeability,
which was never aimed at anyway). Since an act of “founding” is of-
ten the reference point for irreducible identities (consider American
exceptionalism with its cult of the Founding Fathers), it is an obvious
strategic point of intervention for the questioning of inherited labels.
Another sport previously considered exclusive, “Athenian democracy,”
Detienne and his group intentionally de‐sacralize as one among many
variant “practices of assembly.” Who comes together, where, and why?
Who speaks, and do they speak otherwise than outside the assembly?
How are procedures codified? What distinguishes the expression of
will and the use of force? The point is not to extract a thin common
denominator (e.g., “people everywhere have forums for the expression
of views”) but to get a sense of the elements that may be found and the
constraints that do or do not apply to their occurrence in a particular
situation. In other words, to establish a basis of likeness that permits
extension into many particular contexts rather than having to be left
behind as condition of ascending into the particular horizon of this or
that historical world. The objection may be raised that such analytic
projects are ahistorical (a variant of the objection that they compare
apples and oranges, or deny the lived socio‐cultural reality of the apple
so as to make it interchangeable with the orange). It is rather, I think,
that they aim at creating an alternative to historicized explanations,
or, in the spirit of critique, that they reveal how often our explanations
of events are a mere thinking‐backwards, in the mode of necessity, of
the results of chance or adventurous combinations.
The tacit criterion of “comparability” among the guilds of histori-
ans and Hellenists, says Detienne, is designed to prevent the kinds of
discovery that emerge from remote comparisons. Historical compar-
ison is organized, it seems, around a blind spot. There are values to
be protected, after all! Just as in a nation with an established church
there is, on the one hand, Religion, and on the other hand, “religions”
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(or superstitions, heresies, cults, and the like), so in even the eminently
secular nation of France there is History, on the one hand, and on the
other “histories” (or anecdote, ethnography, counter‐example). The po-
sition of “historiographe du roi,” of royal historiographer, is no longer
directly salaried by the Palace, but the status of French history persists,
as does the expectation that its genesis will be traced back only to the
most honorable lineages. By declaring that ancient Athens is an apple
and contemporary Mali, medieval Japan, north India in the age of the
Mahâbhârata, and so forth are oranges, you are taking away the com-
paratist’s license to compare—and that is the point of it all. One does
not want comparison.What one wants is the infinitely more rewarding
untroubled confirmation of uniqueness.
Detienne’s cartography of these two comparison‐free zones leads
him to suspect a defensive attitude warping, in his view, the objectivity
of theoretical investigation. Why should we not compare the behavior
of the European Parliament with that of the Ochollo village councils
in Abyssinia, for example? Would it not be to the eventual advantage
of the concept of democracy to show that it is not limited to a single
particular place and time? The “national exemption” from comparison
is short‐sighted in more ways than one. To accept the comparability of
one’s own tradition with those of others is to give up a certain measure
of self‐centeredness, to abandon the postulate of one’s uniqueness, and
to risk injury to one’s self‐concept. Let us imagine that a high priest
of the French historical profession were to come secretly by night and
confess to us that a compelling national interest precluded compara-
tive investigation into the identity of France or the miracle of the West.
Would this excuse not be subject to further reason and argument? A
challenger might show that the benefit of narcissistic fairy tales is out-
weighed by the general interest in building up an archive of mutually
comparable human experiences from which to reason about possible
futures to be shared by a great many peoples.
It may seem that Detienne’s polemic is directed at specifically
French folkways. After all, in tracing the history of this prejudice he
refers to the Sorbonne, the Collège de France, the concours de l’agrégation
and similar institutions. The steady succession of Regius Professors of
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history and classical studies in the French university through Monar-
chy, Revolution, Empire, Republic, and so forth, as opposed to the late
and scattershot establishment of anthropology in the postwar period,
would seem to make this a local story. But look to the English‐speaking
countries and Germany, where a similar hierarchy of professions, and
one within professions, obtains. The history of the home country is
always and everywhere the best‐rewarded branch of history, occu-
pying the majority of positions in teaching and research, filling the
publishers’ seasonal lists, becoming, for most people, “History.”8 To
speak only of my own country, American self‐absorption is an industry.
Not only the universities, also the TV channels are full of it. In some
countries the study of ancient Greece and Rome retains, despite a
notable falling‐off of monetary investment, a certain old‐fashioned
prestige but is always standing by for reserve duty when it is a matter
of recalling “who we are,” what the meaning of democracy or justice is.
Those who study the inhabitants of China, Guatemala or Madagascar,
or the Middle Ages and the Safavids, are looked on as providers of
anecdote, if not counterexample. People so far out of the mainstream
are not, to be blunt, “us,” although somehow the Greeks and Romans
are considered to be part of “us.”
8 For some indications of publishing and sales trends in US history, see Andrew Kahn
and Rebecca Onion, “Is HistoryWritten ByMen, AboutMen?,” Slate, 6 January 2016,
available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2016/01/
popular_history_why_are_so_many_history_books_about_men_by_men.html
(accessed October 9, 2018).
Negative Privilege
Detienne’s examples suggest that comparison is called off where some-
thing seen as uniquely good is at stake, where there is a danger of rel-
ativizing some jealously guarded claim to national or cultural dignity.
But a similar resistance to comparison arises where the uniquely bad
is thought to lurk.The permissibility of comparisons is presented as an
epistemic matter (a matter of knowing what is and is not comparable)
but is more accurately described as ethical (a matter of knowing what it
is right and wrong to compare). Between the epistemic and the ethical,
much implicit traffic occurs.
The Historikerstreit in late-1980s Germany, the “quarrel of the histo-
rians” over the interpretation of the causes of Hitler’s takeover of the
Weimar Republic and of the Nazi murder of Jews, Romani, the hand-
icapped, and political opponents, was in large part a reaction to the
historian Ernst Nolte’s attempt to treat that historical catastrophe as
comparable to other humanly‐caused disasters of the twentieth century
and thus as implying, in the view of many readers, equivalence among
them. As Jürgen Kocka sums up the quarrel:
Themost challenging and unacceptable thesis in the “historians’ quar-
rel” consisted in the imputation of a causal connection between the
Bolsheviks’ previous “Asiatic class extermination” and theNational So-
cialists’ “mass extermination”, whichmade the latter a rational, inten-
tionally preventive and thusmeaningful reaction to the former.Hardly
any historian has defended this thesis of Nolte’s. […]
The comparison, pronounced but never carried out by Nolte,
Fest, and others, between, on the one side, Nazi dictatorship and the
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Holocaust, and on the other, the other dictatorships and genocides
of the twentieth century, was [at least] more debatable. It had the
aim (overtly formulated by Nolte) of questioning the singularity of
the Nazi mass murders. […] The fact that comparison is here being
used to relativize the seriousness of the thing being compared in no
way invalidates the methodical usefulness of comparison. Moreover I
find the category of “singularity” not especially useful, whether inme-
thodical, political, or pedagogical terms: if one holds Nazi mass terror
to be an absolutely singular thing and removes it from comparative
analysis, one is not far from maintaining that such a thing can never
be repeated.1
Theword “singularity”must be taken as expressing not a fact but a reac-
tion based on value. Perhaps even a wish. For Kocka, nothing in history
can legitimately be excluded from becoming subject to the practice of
comparing, but particular acts of comparison act to trivialize or nullify
the things being compared, and that is worth refusing.
Thus even comparisons between the horrors of Stalin and Hitler are
valid and possible. But with what cognitive aims? In order to perform
comparisons systematically, one must know what questions are to be
answered with the aid of comparison. […] Why would a better insight
into the motives, dimensions, mechanisms and consequences of Bol-
shevik terror reduce German responsibility or collective guilt for Nazi
crimes, or remove the burdens of memory?2
When the focus is sharpened in that way, it is of course absurd to seek
relief for collective responsibility in comparisons. Kocka returns sev-
eral times in his essay to the theme of historians’ professional duty to
their “specific realm of objects, specific methods, specific knowledge, a
1 Jürgen Kocka, “Deutsche Identität und historischer Vergleich: Nach dem ‘Historik-
erstreit,’” Politik und Zeitgeschichte, supplement toDas Parlament 40/41 (1988): 15-28,
p. 21. For a representative selection of articles from the quarrel, see Rudolf Aug-
stein et al., “Historikerstreit”: Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit
der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung, eighth edition (Munich: Piper, 1991).
2 Kocka, “Deutsche Identität und historischer Vergleich,” p. 22.
Negative Privilege 49
specific rationality of discourse”which should have prevented “polariza-
tions and escalations” like those seen in the “quarrel.”3 In particular, the
historian’s brief does not include issuing moral verdicts or proclama-
tions about national identity. But this retreat into professional “ground
rules” obscures the context that made even such poor arguments as
Nolte’s an occasion for dramatic pronouncements about the nation, the
lessons of the past and the dangers of relativism. Within only a few
years the political frame surrounding this 1986-88 debate—the situa-
tion of the Bundesrepublik, its relation to NATO and the United States,
the competition between West and East, the habits of Cold War think-
ing—would melt away. In the ideological climate of divided Germany,
the polarization that Kocka and others ascribed to Nolte and his sup-
porters was to some extent an inescapable given —which is not to say
that such polarization provides the best angle for analysis. To say that
the Nazi murders were understandable “in the context of the times” and
not different in kind frommass murders going on elsewhere in Eurasia
accomplishes a specific local purpose, according to Jürgen Habermas’s
response to Nolte:
The ideological planners want to create consensus for a reanimated
national consciousness, and at the same time they want to banish the
nation‐state’s foes from the territory of NATO. For this manipulation
Nolte’s theory has great advantages. He can kill two birds with one
stone: The Nazi crimes lose their singularity at the same time as they
become at least understandable as a response to Bolshevik annihila-
tion campaigns still going on in the present. Auschwitz shrinks to the
proportions of a technical innovation and is explained by the “Asiatic”
threat of an enemy who is still at our gates.4
In other words, the comparison was always there, the danger was just
in activating it for a susceptible public. Thus Kocka’s appeals to histor-
ical professionalism were somewhat beside the point. Nolte protests
against the “black and white images of our militant contemporaries”
3 Kocka, “Deutsche Identität und historischer Vergleich,” p. 18.
4 Jürgen Habermas, “Eine Art Schadensabwicklung,” 62-76 in Historikerstreit, p. 71.
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that he contends have worked to suppress the good sense of his modest
proposal, but it seems that he was counting on his message being car-
ried by the ambient resources of just such polarization.5 The “quarrel”
closely followed and echoed another crisis point in the postwar order,
when Ronald Reagan accompaniedHelmut Kohl to an official commem-
oration at the war cemetery at Bitburg, having been made aware that it
contained graves ofWaffen-SSmembers.6 The visit might have been in-
tended as a gesture of reconciliation, but it also suggested an invitation
to Germans to consider that Americans had joined in the SecondWorld
War not to save Europe (and Germany) from fascism but to defend Ger-
many from communism—exactly as the fascists had claimed to do. Such
events put the German past, as well as the continuity of the two German
states with their parallel postwar occupations, in a rather glaring light.
They also ran athwart certain founding dogmas of the Bundesrepub-
lik: the clean break with the past, the special relationship with Israel,
the culture of memory. Habermas, with his public record of allegiance
to a political form consisting of constitutional rights and communica-
tive rationality and not to “blood and soil,” could not but repudiate an
apologetic attitude for which one genocide could excuse another.7
The price of the normalization and reconciliation demanded by
Nolte and his allies Hillgruber and Stürmer—not to mention Helmut
Kohl and Ronald Reagan—was too high formost historians of Germany,
who found the comparison inadmissible. Even today the singularity
5 Nolte, “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will,” 39-47 in Historikerstreit, p. 42. See
also Nolte, “Zwischen Geschichtslegende und Revisionismus? Das Dritte Reich im
Blickwinkel des Jahres 1980,” in Historikerstreit, pp. 13-35, where it is claimed that
“the demonization of the Third Reich cannot be accepted” because no human event
can be “wholly good or wholly bad, wholly bright or wholly dark” (p. 34).
6 For some responses to this event, see Geoffrey H. Hartman, ed., Bitburg in Moral
and Political Perspective (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). Both Nolte
andHabermas call on Bitburg as example: seeNolte, “Vergangenheit,” inHistoriker-
streit, p. 42, andHabermas, “Vomöffentlichen Gebrauch der Historie: Das offizielle
Selbstverständnis der Bundesrepublik bricht auf,” in Historikerstreit, pp. 245-46.
7 “The only patriotism that does not alienate us [Germans] from theWest is a consti-
tutional patriotism [Verfassungspatriotismus].” Habermas, “Eine Art Schadensab-
wicklung,” p. 75.
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thesis acts to deter such comparisons. The fear is that reducing the
Nazis’ greatest crime to a mere “case” of something larger will dimin-
ish its singularity, that diminution will banalize it, that banality will
rationalize it, that rationalization will in the end legitimate it. Hence
the need for a taboo. Kocka, in his retrospective on the episode, does
not refuse comparison entirely but redirects it.
To be sure, one cannot simply hold that Germany must be compared
with France, England, the Scandinavian countries, or North America.
But there are reasons for doing so—if one wants to discover through
comparative research how the “German catastrophe” came about
and what it means. For Germany was not only associated with those
Western countries by a similar state of economic development and
social modernization, but also through common traditions of en-
lightenment, of human and civil rights, of legal and constitutional
governance. Nonetheless Germany became fascist and totalitarian,
and the Western countries did not. Why? […] With whom one is to be
compared is, in private as in public life, but also in historical research, a
decisive question. The choice one makes influences the results of the
comparison and necessarily carries normative implications.8
Comparison must compare what is comparable, as the maintainers of
the consensus that so frustrated Detienne’s enterprise would say. If you
want to win knowledge from a comparison, you must restrict it to cases
that are by and large similar and historically related.Thus, Germany vs.
Sweden is a good and instructive comparison, but comparing Germany
with the USSR or Cambodia is a hooliganish, absurd, even offensive act.
Germany belongs in the set of Western countries with Enlightenment
heritage and the rule of law, and the question for Kocka is how it fell out
of that set,what wentwrong in that specific historical instance. It is best
if the comparison points up specifiable distal events as the cause of rele-
vant differences: thus, if there had been no inflation, if Hindenburg had
acted differently in 1933, or if the Weimar constitution had been con-
ceived otherwise… Kocka (or his editor) titled another contribution to
8 Kocka, “Deutsche Identität und historischer Vergleich,” p. 27.
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the quarrel, “Hitler ShouldNot Be Repressed By Stalin and Pol Pot”—the
name of the Cambodian dictator being brought in, apparently, as evi-
dence of the manifest absurdity of comparisons between advanced and
backward societies. By reaching for far‐off analogs, it seemed, Nolte
and his associates were attempting to shrink the crimes of the Nazis
in a distanced perspective, to make them mere line‐items in a much
larger historical accounting. The focus on a uniquely German guilt, so
went the relativist argument, derived from the ideological need to keep
up political pressure on the Germans so as to ensure their subordina-
tion in a new international order designed by the victors of the Second
World War. As if to say: ‘everybody was committing genocide, we just
had the misfortune to get caught.’ Or, more particularly: ‘you object to
right‐wing violence; well, here are a hundred examples of left‐wing vi-
olence, arranged in a series from Lenin to Pol Pot, with numbers to
boot.’ And a corresponding emphasis in the work of these revisionist
historians on the harm done to the Germans by bombing, invasion, oc-
cupation, and resettlement certainly confirms the impression that the
aim of comparison in Nolte’s account of the long “European civil war”
was to distract, neutralize, and shift blame.
Thirty years after the quarrel, the singularity of theNazi crimes, fore-
grounded in the title of the Piper Verlag collection, is no longer so obvi-
ous.9 Many instances of “acts committedwith intent to destroy, inwhole
9 Which is not to say that the arguments about “singularity” and “incomparability”
have been put to rest. Their implications for national self‐regard remain even as
the nation reshapes itself. The aim of insisting on the singularity of the German
extermination effort, for Egon Flaig, is “to terrorize the intellectual world” with “re-
ligious language and attitude.” Flaig’s own attitude does not shy from comparisons,
not to say hyperbole: “This thought‐prohibition is worse than the terroristic uproar
on the part of fanaticized Muslim masses against the Danish caricatures [of Mo-
hammed in 2005]. That caused the deaths of seventy people. But this prohibition
not only builds a fence of taboos around a considerable area of the twentieth cen-
tury, declaring it an intellectual no‐man’s‐land in which the high priests of the hy-
per‐absolute are empowered to shoot to killwithoutwarning; it delegitimates aba-
sic operation of conceptual thought […]” (“Das Unvergleichliche, hier wird’s Ereig-
nis. Reflexion uber die moralisch erzwungene Verdummung,” Merkur 701 [2007]:
978-81, p. 979).
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or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such,” upon
state command or otherwise, come readily to mind.10 And it is not just
that new crimes pile up.Old ones are rediscovered and linked to the sig-
nal instances. Jürgen Zimmerer has argued that Nazi actions in the East
followed patterns set by colonial warfare in German Southwest Africa.
These genocidal acts, predating 1933 by a generation, were, like the cam-
paign in the “Eastern Territories,” framed as a competition for space
and legitimated by labels of racial “inferiority” and “superiority.”11 (The
comparison was in itself not new. Hannah Arendt and Aimé Césaire,
among others, had pointed to continuities between the management
of colonies and the occupied East. The novelty was in the wealth of de-
tail and the tracing of specific techniques transferred from one domain
to the other.) Where Kocka could assert, on grounds of developmental
typology, that comparisons across boundaries of East/West or industri-
alized/nonindustrialized were doomed to yield nonsense, a longer and
wider German historical memory demands that comparisons with the
non-Western world be made, only not country‐to-country and without
the fiction of assessing independent, parallel paths through modernity.
Other conditions of historical understanding now differ. There is no
longer, for example, a competition between the BRD and the DDR to
incarnate the “true” postfascist Germany—a feature of 1980s historical
writing that apparently motivated some of the competitive rhetoric on
the “singularity” of the Nazi crimes.12 In Germany, the generation of
10 United Nations, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide” (1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/
documents/atrocity‐crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Preven-
tion%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf
(accessed October 17, 2018). The term was coined by the lawyer Raphael Lemkin
in 1944.
11 See Jürgen Zimmerer, Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz?: Beiträge zum Verständnis von
Kolonialismus und Holocaust (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2011), a collection of essays orig-
inally published between 2003 and 2011. The “Mondaugen” sections of Thomas
Pynchon’s novels V. (New York: Lippincott, 1963) and Gravity’s Rainbow (New York:
Viking, 1973) already drew this connection.
12 See Historikerstreit, pp. 240, 38.
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“Flakhelfer”, who experienced the Second World War as teenagers, has
gone into retirement. And the break‐up of the Soviet Union and the
recovery of independence for its client states has opened archives and
licensed the release of historical memories of oppression.
If at the time of the Historikerstreit the memory of genocide was
dominated by one central, recognized, unambiguous and much‐dis-
cussed instance (the industrialized killing of millions of Jews by Nazi
Germany), around that case stoodmany others, usually analyzed and ar-
gued for in reference to the paradigmatic case as described by Raphael
Lemkin in 1944.13 These “other genocides” received less attention and
were in addition more or less vigorously contested when brought up in
public forums (for example, the Armenian genocide and the near‐ex-
termination of Native Americans). One singularity worth noting is that
the Germans themselves recognized the case for which their nation had
been responsible; Turkey, the United States, and other perpetrators re-
sisted the application of the term “genocide” and often denied the record
of events or sought to explain them away. By the early twenty‐first cen-
tury, dozens or hundreds of claims of murder on an ethnic scale had
become common knowledge.
The loss of singularity, along with the unequal acknowledgment
that genocidal histories receive, brings a sense of unease when com-
parisons are made, as they inevitably are. The International Holocaust
Remembrance Alliance, headquartered in Berlin, warns of the “many
challenges” and “a number of pitfalls” that loom when analogies are
drawn among ethnic extermination campaigns:
Care must be taken [, they write,] not to equate, diminish, or trivialise
either the Holocaust or the genocides to which the Holocaust is com-
pared. […] Care must be taken not to create hierarchies of suffering or
allow the value of a comparative study to be diminished by political
13 For a representation of the conceptual field corresponding to this description, see
for example the InternationalHolocaust RemembranceAlliance’s page “TheHolo-
caust and Other Genocides,” available at https://www.holocaustremembrance.
com/educational‐materials/holocaust‐and-other‐genocides (accessed October 1,
2018).
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or social agendas or competing memories. […] This being said, there
are certain reasons or strategies for comparing the Holocaust to other
genocides that are not fruitful and that definitely should be avoided.
Some of these are:
1. The link to other genocides is made to hide certain aspects of
one’s national history, such as collaborationwithNazi Germanyduring
the Holocaust.
2. The Holocaust is seen as a means of political power in contem-
porary politics and the link to the Holocaust is made out of political
considerations.
3. The link to other genocides is made to diminish or trivialise the
Holocaust.14
Good and high‐minded guidelines, but their application is not straight-
forward. Every one of the new nationalisms or resentments of Europe,
North America and Asia invokes the Holocaust in one way or another.15
The new nations of Eastern Europe assert their history of oppression by
the Soviet Union,whose inheritor state, the Russian Federation, is quick
to claim that ethnic Russians are the targets of Holocaust‐like prepar-
ative measures in the Baltic States, Crimea and Donetsk. For many
Ukrainians, it is beyond question that the Holodomor or Great Famine
of the 1930s was an act of genocide planned and carried out by Stalin;
for Russia, presumably, saying so is a grab at “political power” on the
international stage and “is made to hide certain aspects of […] national
history, such as collaboration.”16 Is the Holocaust “diminished and trivi-
alized” thereby? Inevitably, incrementally.When national memories are
constructed around such events, it is sure that “hierarchies of suffering”
14 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, “The Holocaust and Other Geno-
cides,” as cited above.
15 On the competitive use of victim tallies, see Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe
Between Hitler and Stalin (London: The Bodley Head, 2010), pp. 402-06.
16 Claims that the UkrainianMaidanmovement in 2013-14 was spearheaded by “fas-
cists” and “collaborators” were key to the Russian propaganda response. See Alec
Luhn, “TheUkrainianNationalism at theHeart of ‘Euromaidan’,” TheNation, 21 Jan-
uary 2014.
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will be created: the national catastrophe is the one taught in schools,
the one pointed at with a “Never again!” on the national holiday. A new
law made to measure in Poland makes it punishable to assert Polish
complicity in the wartime exterminations.17 The name of no event is
more often taken in vain, it seems, than the murder of the six million
Jews. With this cheapening of memory goes forgetting of the causes.
Every scheme of “ethnic cleansing,” executed or merely desired, every
newly‐launched ethnic politicalmovement, calls on the theory of Lebens-
raum or stokes the fear of “population replacement” in its propaganda.
Comparison, it would seem, has a lot to answer for. Perhaps it would
have been better to erect a higher fence around it.
Only, with themultiplication of sources and claims, no fence is good
enough. When one paradigmatic case guided the conceptualization of
extreme evil, at least comparison had a reference point. In works like
Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands, such categories as nation, ideology, and
ethnicity provide some interpretive guidance, but no clear answers.
People in the zone “between Hitler and Stalin” (as the book’s subtitle
has it) were rounded up, imprisoned, starved, shot, deported, and
sometimes mined post mortem for dental fillings, for any reason or
none, by uniformed troops, secret police, greedy neighbors, or fellow
prisoners. Collectivization, resettlement, and war are sometimes the
17 The amendment to a 1998 measure founding the Institute of National Remem-
brance was originally signed into law in February 2018 and modified to redefine
“public misattribution to the Polish Nation or the Polish State of responsibility
or co‐responsibility for Nazi crimes” as a civil, not criminal, offense in June 2018.
For an argument defending it, see Mateusz Morawiecki, “Poland’s Misunderstood
Holocaust Law,” Foreign Policy (19 March 2018), available at https://foreignpolicy.
com/2018/03/19/polands‐misunderstood-holocaust‐law/ (accessed July 3, 2018).
On controversies surrounding the memory of the war in Poland and its memo-
rials, see Tim Snyder, “Poland vs. History,” The New York Review of Books Daily
(May 3, 2016), available at https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/05/03/poland‐vs-
history‐museum-gdansk/ (accessedMay6, 2016). On the adoption of post‐colonial
language by populist governments, see Dorota Kolodziejczyk, “Comparative Posts
Going Political—the Postcolonial Backlash in Poland,” 177-91 in Lars Jensen, Julia
Suárez-Krabbe, Christian Groes, and Zoran Lee Pecic, eds., Postcolonial Europe: Com-
parative Reflections After the Empires (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
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cause of killing and sometimes merely its occasion.With death totals of
between ten and eleven million on the Nazi side and between four and
six million on the Stalinist side, comparing the wrongs seems absurd,
and concern with left‐right formal symmetry an unbecoming fetish.
Overlapping invasions, partisan groups, and food shortages muddle
the accounting. The Eastern Europeans who lived through those times
“experienced overlap and interaction” between the two systems that
to us appear distinct and opposed; worse yet, they were “condemned
to compare” them in such moments of decision as taking off down a
refugee path or surrendering to one or the other enemy.18
Responses to Snyder’s work—which was bound to be contro-
versial through its synthesis of rough data and necessarily selective
narrative—have often accused it of encouraging a thesis of “double
genocide,” in which the genocide led by Stalin cancels out that led by
Hitler (or the other way round). The work has certainly been received
as encouraging by many people whose stories of suffering were not
expressible under the conventions and taboos of the pre-1991 universe
of memory.19 Reproving Snyder’s attention to the deaths in the East,
Daniel Lazare calls him “very much a son of Nolte” and Bloodlands “less
an effort to understand what happened in 1933-45 than a milestone in
the process of engagement with local revanchist forces.”20 If one geno-
cide can erase another, then obviously “equation, diminishment and
trivialization” are going on. So long as competition for prominence in
18 Snyder, Bloodlands, p. 392.
19 See a round‐up of critical passages, with concentration on the Lithuanian
reception of Bloodlands, in Menachem Kaiser, “Unshared History: Timothy
Snyder’s Bloodlands,” Los Angeles Review of Books (16 October 2012), avail-
able at https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/unshared‐histories-timothy‐snyders-
bloodlands/#! (accessed October 14, 2018).
20 See Lazare’s engagingly titled review, “Timothy Snyder’s Lies,” Jacobin (9
September 2014), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/09/timothy‐snyders-lies/
(accessed October 16, 2018). It particularly irks Lazare that Snyder has called
attention to Vladimir Putin’s attempts to reclaim lost Soviet territories. See also
Lazare, “Ernst Nolte’s Revenge,” Jacobin (18 October 2016), available at https://
www.jacobinmag.com/2016/10/ernst‐nolte-stalin‐hitler-fascism‐historikerstreit
(accessed October 18, 2018).
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memory is conceived as a zero‐sum game, the new‐found recognition
of some must take away from that claimed by others. But no.
Why should memory be so scarce? Why must comparison be taken
as equivalence? The perceived threat must be that the line separating
good from evil, oppressors from resisters, socialists from fascists, is
about to dissolve, and those for whom that line also marks Us from
Them are afraid of no longer being recognizable as a We. But the cog-
nitive virtues of the single line and of the triumphant ideology are lim-
ited. A rigid comparison that serves only to mark difference impedes
understanding no less than a sloppy comparison that makes everything
alike.
Historical andmoral comparison cannot get stuck on theHitler‐ver-
sus-Stalin seesaw.There are more horrors to be explained, horrors that
concern more parts of the world. The comparative issue surrounding
genocide is no longer unipolar. It is rather a large and confusing plane
without the clear ideological orientations that shaped the choice and
interpretation of evidence in the “historians’ quarrel.” If, as the IHRA
puts it, “the impact of the Holocaust to our present Western society is
immense as it took place in the heart of Europe,” the slaughter by the
Bosnian Serbs, taking place no farther from the mythical “heart of Eu-
rope” than Treblinka and in a time of relative European peace, should
put to rest any antitheses between European civilization and outer bar-
barism.21 Rather than conceiving of the “other genocides” as transla-
tions and of the paradigmatic genocide as the original with which every
translationmust be compared, in a one‐to-many relation, the epistemic
ends of comparison might be better served by decentering and flatten-
ing the category.When, in the classic phrase, apples are compared with
oranges, it is usually without a presupposition about which fruit ismore
21 It has always seemed tome a startlingmark of provincialism that both Susan Son-
tag and Bernard-Henri Lévy so emphasized the scandal of shells falling on a city in
Europe, a city of civilized people with cafés and theaters. See Susan Sontag, “Godot
Comes to Sarajevo,”NewYorkReview of Books (21 October 1993), available at https://
www.nybooks.com/articles/1993/10/21/godot‐comes-to‐sarajevo/ (accessed 18Oc-
tober 2018).
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genuinely, more adequately, or more exemplarily fruit. But I have heard
of a small boy who, after years of wartime privation, encountered an
orange for the first time and called it a drôle de pomme (phony apple).22
Although, in our experience, apples may be primary, we cannot right-
fully deny oranges an existence and a history quite separate from those
of the apple. Comparison, to be just, needs to be able to reverse such
assumed orders of importance.
So when Jürgen Zimmerer understands themurder of the European
Jews as an offshoot of the German colonial enterprise of a generation
earlier, this clearly demands a redistribution of our attention and a re-
organization of the semantic space around the term “genocide.” Zim-
merer’s book of essays, in fact, barely discusses the plight of the Jews,
and does so only fleetingly and in parenthesis. At least one scholar has
voiced a pained response to this innovation. “Zimmerer is too careful a
scholar to have not realized that he repeated, essentially, the gesture to
which Holocaust scholars have long objected: elimination of Jews from
the discussion uncannily echoes the Nazis’ project.”23 This seems rather
harsh. Is it certain that the shoe does not go on the other foot? Can one
not imagine an African scholar contending that the emphasis on Jew-
ish victims, only a subset (per Zimmerer’s thesis) of colonially‐inspired
suffering, unduly excludes Africans from a history to which they should
be central? The point of Zimmerer’s research, if I read it rightly, is not
that the two genocides are equivalent, but that they are connected, that
their victim‐classes are in fact conjoint; the claim that it marginalizes
the Jews pulls the classes apart. Moreover, as to the ground of the anal-
ogy, was it not essential to the Nazis’ project to maintain the Jews’ iden-
tity as Jews while stripping them of their identity as citizens and next
22 I owe this reminiscence to André Martinet.
23 KittyMillet, TheVictims of Slavery,Colonization, and theHolocaust: A ComparativeHis-
tory of Persecution (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), p. 168 note 18. See also pp. 9, 16,
18. The conclusion of Millet’s book, moreover, seems to imply a condemnation of
comparison generally: “To displace the specificity of any one of these groups [i.e.,
the colonized, the enslaved, and the victims of theHolocaust] is to argue for an in-
terchangeability on which their persecutors had relied. It was the calculus of the
Middle Passage, the colonial massacre and the gas chamber” (p. 166).
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of their rights as human beings? Analyzing genocide without reference
to Jews as such does not take away the relationships and rights that
would have protected them, if rights had been at issue. And although
Raphael Lemkin was unavoidably thinking about the fate of his fellow
Jews in 1943-44 as he elaborated the definition of genocide, he cast it,
as a lawyer must, in more abstract terms. No one in 1944 could know
that the Bosnians, the Tutsis, the educated classes of Cambodia, or any
of the other groups subsequently slated for genocide were on the list,
nor could the exact preliminaries of their destruction be foretold. Laws
are future‐oriented. They deal in open categories (“anyone who…”). But
the concepts behind them can only come from the past.24 The point of
defining the crime of genocide was to prevent future occurrences by en-
acting binding international laws to that effect (an astonishingly vision-
ary act).Without a sufficiently general definition, one cannot recognize
a new threat as it emerges. And to be sure, there will be those who seek
to understand genocide in order not to prevent it but to repeat it. Like
computer viruses and electoral interference, genocide can succeed in
repeating itself only by not repeating itself precisely. Although compar-
ison inspires fear of loss and is resisted with all the power associated
with group identity—the sacred and its opposite, the accursed—it may
be that only comparison provides the resources for holding off the next
threat to the very identities that were to be defended by resisting com-
parison.
What makes a comparison plausible is a situation.Theophanes’s in-
ability to conceive of a comparison, the Klansman’s disingenuous plea
for equity, the national stigma for which Nolte and associates sought a
remedy through the Bolshevik Black Legend, and so forth are all “justi-
fied”, epistemically and morally, through an implied situation that may
be imaginary, exaggerated, hemmed in by ignorance, or shaped in keep-
ing with the best available information; and when a public (consisting
largely of robots, it may be) endorses these situations, the comparison
works. That is to say, it does its work, orienting responses and actions.
24 As Andrea Frisch pointed out tome, thismeans that the law always comes too late
to do justice to those whose cases shape the law.
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To redescribe the situation, to refute a misleading picture of the situ-
ation, is to enable a different set of comparisons. Surely not much is
wrong with comparison that was not already wrong with the initial en-
dorsement of a situation.
When Geoffrey Hartman, discussing his video archive of Holocaust
testimonies at Yale in the late 1980s, was asked by a Chinese gradu-
ate student in what perspective he would place the perhaps 30 million
preventable deaths from hunger in the Great Leap Forward, he quite
honorably said he had no answer.25 To a new (for him) situation he re-
sponded with no comparison one way or the other.
25 Personalmemory; thequestionerwasQianNanxiu. Thirtymillion, a number often
mentioned at the time,maybe on thehigh side, but it is hard to put an enddate on
the events. For a report on thedisaster and its causes, bothhumanandnatural, see
Yang Jisheng, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine 1958–1962, trans. Stacy Mosher
and Guo Jian (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012).

Birds of a Feather
A tourist memory. One late afternoon in June 1980, on my way to Novi
Pazar, I was drinking beer with the fire brigade of Kraljevo, Yugoslavia:
five young men from the area, one of whom bore the slightly unusual
name Ahmet. Ahmet was drinking lemonade. I did not know much
Serbo-Croatian, so virtually all of the banter eluded me, but no one
seemed to voice hostility or to push the jokes and gossip into conflict
territory by making remarks about anyone’s diet, home town, mother
or sister. The five were just “colleagues,” as working‐class people in Yu-
goslavia called each other at the time, not members of rival tribes. If I
had asked, I could have found out if Bogdan described himself as Serb
or, perhaps, Slovene on his mother’s side, if Dragan was Montenegrin
or even something more exotic; but in 1980 it would not have been a
description compelling action from anyone.
The sun went down. On a hilltop opposite the town somebody lit
a series of bonfires that spelled out TITO. (The Marshal-President had
died a few weeks before.) “With Tito gone, the country’s going to hell,”
said one of the firemen.Cult of personality, how very East‐bloc, I thought to
myself: actually no big deal, somebody else will come along, orderly succession
and all that.
Somebody did come along, a succession and proliferation of some-
bodies: men on the order of Slobodan Milosević, whose political gifts
were fitted to narrower ideals and audiences. I often wondered what
had become of the firemen I had sat with for a couple of hours. Was
Ahmet promoted, say, to brigade chief, to the dissatisfaction of his fel-
lows,whomuttered that it was all due to themayor’s assistant, aMuslim
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as everybody knew?That wouldmake sense of his promotion, given that
by the 1990s the television and the electoral billboards were constantly
reminding one of the danger posed by these shifty invaders whose very
presence was an insult and an aggression against the Serbs. And did
the colleagues then perhaps smash Ahmet’s car windows, set fire to his
house, or do worse, sure of being protected by nationalist organizations
in the region that might also enroll some of them in their paramilitaries
morphing into regular armies? Did Ahmet too join an armed group?
Were the members of our friendly after‐work beer party now firing at
each other across the ridges of the Golija?1
Genocide is a peril of composite societies. Homogeneous societies
can have civil wars, wars that end with a defeat but not an extermina-
tion. To create the conditions that make the eradication of one group
by another seem rational and desirable, much work must be done. The
agency for this is often performative speech, speech that claims to dis-
cover a fissure but that would be better described as simultaneously
creating and confirming it: speech that classes individuals into tribes,
creates collective personalities and narratives of grievance, outlines a
future free of enemies. There is, indeed, a dreadfully self‐motivating
literary quality to such speech. The process begins in comparison—the
cry of “Unfair!”—and, through address to a progressively narrower au-
dience, toward the unipolar incomparable; it begins in resentment (that
eminently comparative feeling) and concludes in solipsism. That group
is richer, stronger, more influential than mine, but only by reversible
circumstance. I am what I am because of what you are; if only you were
not, I would be more truly myself.2
Histories of Rwanda’s interethnic violence often begin by pointing
out that the Hutu and Tutsi “races” are mythical constructions. They
claim that in a traditional past (sometimes described in suspiciously
1 My memories have been augmented by reading Latinka Perović et al., eds., Yu-
goslavia in Historical Perspective (Belgrade: Helsinki Commission on Human Rights
in Serbia, 2017).
2 The first part of this sentence echoes a frequently encountered paraphrase of the
ethic of Ubuntu or solidarity; the second is invented to express the exclusivism of
certain collectivist ethics.
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glowing terms), the two groups typically lived on the selfsame hill, in-
termarried, owed fealty to the same (Tutsi) king, and pursued overlap-
ping, socially stratified livelihoods: cattle raising and the arts of political
intrigue for the elite, tilling of the soil for the peasants.This changed as
Rwanda moved toward independence from Belgium in the late 1950s.
Political movements vied for attention and a share of the pie, recruit-
ing their membership along ethnic lines. The most successful of these
movements was Grégoire Kayibanda’s Parmehutu (Parti du Mouvement
d’Émancipation Hutu). The 1957 “Hutu Manifesto” signed by Kayibanda
and eight other Hutu intellectuals advised the transitional government
to take measures in favor of the racially‐defined bloc they claimed to
represent, reportedly some 85% of the population, and to break the
“Tutsi monopoly” on political office, cultural authority, economic op-
portunity, and landholding.3
Now it is a truth generally admitted that parties and candidates pick
out grievances, ambitions, credos, and group identities the way rock-
climbers discern cracks and ledges. But it was not just about getting
votes. The death of the Rwandan king in 1959 was followed by the first
wave of organized massacres of Tutsis. In telling how Rwandan democ-
racy became identified with a racial politics of division and majority
resentment, historians of the genocide often reproduce the following
quotation from Kayibanda (president 1962-73):
The Hutu and the Tutsi communities are two nations in a single state.
Two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy,
who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts and feelings as if
3 “Note sur l’aspect social du problème racial indigène au Ruanda” (24 March 1957),
in Paul Quilès, Pierre Brana and Bernard Cazeneuve, eds., Enquête sur la tragédie
rwandaise (1990-94) (Paris: Assemblée nationale, 1998), vol. 2, pp. 100-07. The Bel-
gians were in Rwanda as a result of a 1924 League of Nations mandate, following
German colonial rule from 1894-1919. OnHutu and Tutsi as “state‐enforced political
identities,” seeMahmoodMamdani,WhenVictims BecomeKillers (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 2002), pp. 73-75.
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they were dwellers of different zones, or inhabitants of different plan-
ets.4
Historians have recognized in these words a loud call for segregation,
by legal measures or by the sword.
The events of November 1959 […] led to a further polarization of at-
titudes and expectations […] A major consequence of the rioting was
to make the prospects of a “peaceful coexistence” between Hutu and
Tutsi all the more remote. Typical of the attitude bred by the events
of November was the tenor of the statement issued by Kayibanda on
November 27—in which hemade a strong case for “segregating” Hutu
and Tutsi into two separate zones as a first step toward a “confederal
organization.” Citing Disraeli, Kayibanda compared the communities
of Rwanda to “two nations in a single state[…]. Two nations between
whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy, who are as ignorant of
each other’s habits, thoughts and feelings as if they were dwellers of
different zones, or inhabitants of different planets.”5
The comparative literature scholar can measure Kayibanda’s success in
dividing Hutu from Tutsi by glancing at the source the politician was
paraphrasing. Benjamin Disraeli’s Sybil is little remembered today for
its literary merits, but one passage of this “Condition of England” novel
is quoted in all the British history textbooks:
Two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy;
who are ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts and feelings, as if
they were dwellers in different zones or inhabitants of different plan-
ets; who are formed by different breeding, are fed by different food,
4 Grégoire Kayibanda, speech of November 27, 1959, as cited in Jenoside, the exhibi-
tion booklet available at the Kigali Memorial Centre dedicated to the victims of the
1994 genocide.
5 René Lemarchand,Rwanda andBurundi (London: Praeger, 1970), pp. 168-69, quoting
a mimeographed supplement to Jya Mbere, November 27, 1959, no. 3.
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are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same
laws […] THE RICH AND THE POOR.6
I suspect that, as observers of the condition of England in 1845 had to be
aware not only of the Corn Laws and the Chartist movement, but also of
the Irish famine, there is an effect of suspense intended in the passage.
“Two nations” with “no intercourse and no sympathy”—is he talking
about the English and the Irish, the Protestants and the Catholics? Is he
going to recite centuries of inherited grievances going all the way back
to Spenser and Cromwell? But the suspense is resolved in favor, not of
ethnicity but economics: “THE RICHANDTHE POOR.”That at least is a
problem amenable of solution. In a country not utterly cleft into parties
or tribes (at least from the point of view of an ambitious young parlia-
mentarian in London), themention of “two nations”works as awarning:
the existence of such a rift was a flaw that novels like Disraeli’s called to
be remedied. Political reform and charitable concern were demanded,
so that the rich and the poor of Englandmight recognize their common
lot. But the fellowship between Hutu and Tutsi had so degenerated by
1959 that Kayibanda could use the very same words to refer to the differ-
ence as a fact and moreover to call urgently for a deeper split, a greater
separation, a finally adequate barrier between the “two nations,” with-
out at all addressing the motives of the original passage. Probably, in
a few years, the mere mention of the number “two” would have been a
sufficient reminder. And, simply because the “two nations” conceit was
found so persuasive by Kayibanda’s Parmehutu hearers, anyone who at-
tempted to bridge the gap, change the subject, or appeal to solidarity
among Rwandans would have been denounced as a compromiser, an
interloper from the opposite side or a traitor to one’s own. There could
be no comparison between the two groups’ fates, no joint mention of
them, that did not confirm the bases of Hutu resentment.The language
of separateness achieved what it claimed to be true and called for more
confirmation in acts of banishment and killing.
6 Benjamin Disraeli, Sybil, or the TwoNations (1845), chap. 5. Available at http://www.
ibiblio.org/disraeli/sybil.pdf (accessed August 3, 2006).
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The rhetoric of “two nations” did not address Tutsi audiences. It did
not, for example, say to them, “Here is what we need from you” or “We
would like you to admit the following”: such propositions would have
implied a shared space of negotiation in which both parties had a com-
mon stake in the outcome. No negotiation involving Tutsi, I surmise,
could have been conceived of as fair. Rather, in the “two nations” speech
a Hutu speaks to other Hutu about the malevolent and deceptive Tutsi.
The “Manifeste Bahutu” of 1957, addressed to the Belgian colonial au-
thorities by a group of Hutu intellectuals including Kayibanda, charac-
terized the majority population as occupying an “eternally inferior sit-
uation” under the “total monopoly” of the baTutsi, a foreign (“Hamite”)
race; without the interposition of the Europeans, the baHutu would be
doomed to “total destruction.” Already in 1957, then, before the first
massacre, the language of the Parmehutu founders excludes anymiddle
ground. And no one in the ensuing decades was able to create it.
Intensely polarized situations like the all‐or-nothing contest imag-
ined and then installed by Kayibanda’s rhetoric make comparison oblig-
atory. Every word, even a number, is charged with competition. Situa-
tions of durable crisis such as the Cold War, decolonization, and parti-
tion leave nothing up to chance in theminds of those subject to them: as
a society is divided into antagonistic camps, the events it perceives and
thewords inwhich it responds to themare drawn into acting asmarkers
on a scoreboard. Reflection and imagination are force‐marched into a
minimumof alternatives. Confirmation bias becomes indistinguishable
from cognition. Tight control over semantic space (seen in the Man-
ifesto’s favored modifiers, “eternal” and “total”) makes concepts rigid,
non‐porous, unalterable. Control over people should follow. In its ef-
fects, obligatory comparison along preset lines is hardly distinguishable
from the prohibition on comparing. Hutu and Tutsi have nothing in com-
mon, says in sum the “Two Nations” speech, except the fact that everything
we lack is something they have (—in other words, the two have everything
in common). Name any challenge the Hutu face and I will reduce it to the exis-
tence of the Tutsi. A certain picture‐book story about decolonization—the
departure of the whites followed by national renewal and unity—col-
lapses in the face of such exterminationalist ideology. (Inequality pre-
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dated the Germans and Belgians; the latter laid the groundwork of eth-
nic rivalry; after they were gone, no available focus of allegiance could
transcend or abolish it.)
The polarization of words correlates with the polarization of au-
diences. The audience (and thus, the metric) of Kayibanda’s claims on
justice is limited to the aggrieved Hutu. It is hard to say which came
first, the language of blame and demonization or the habit of speaking
only to one’s own side. Both tendencies were probably locked in a mu-
tual feedback loop. On the eve of the Belgians’ departure, the authors
of the “Bahutu Manifesto” saw little more in the tasks and opportuni-
ties of independence than pursuing their interethnic grudge. Successive
Parmehutu administrations’ lack of interest in dealing with the mate-
rial problems facing the country amounted to an ex post facto validation
of the Manifesto’s obsession with the “two nations” rivalry. A growing
population and scarce farmland reinforced a zero‐sum logic. The con-
fiscated resources of those killed or pushed out could be redistributed
to Parmehutu followers, empirically verifying the thesis that extermi-
nation solved material problems. Refugees fleeing the country and es-
tablishing camps in Uganda and Burundi, from which they took part in
the civil wars of the region, gave backing to the perception of threat. All
these factors seemed steadily to reinforce the Hutu‐centric epistemol-
ogy, until the signing of the Arusha accords in 1993.That agreementwith
the Rwandan Patriotic Front would have allowed exiled Tutsi to return
and participate in Rwandan political life. Hailed by the “international
community” as a much‐needed step towards peace in Central Africa, it
threatened to deprive the Hutu ethnic nationalists of their mainspring
in crisis rhetoric by showing that compromise was both necessary and
possible.7 In any event, the accords were disavowed by Rwanda’s pres-
ident before they were even signed. They offended against Hutu exclu-
sivity. Not only had Kayibanda’s successor negotiated with the devil, but
7 Conditions “on the ground” were not amenable to reconciliation, to be sure. On the
“eerie calm” of areas reconquered, pre‐genocide, by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (a
result of the flight of Hutu populations), seeMamdani,WhenVictims Become Killers,
pp. 186-89, 192.
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he had implicitly conceded that Tutsi, too, had grievances and deserved
to be accommodated. The monopoly was broken. The peace treaty was
therefore retransmitted to the populace as a betrayal and, rather than
leading to reconciliation, helped tomotivate the biggest episode ofmass
killing in Rwandan history, what is known (with an unmerited singular)
as “the Rwandan genocide.”
Comparison accompanied every step on the way there.8
8 I amnot trying to explain theRwandangenocide, only seeking to characterize some
of the rhetorical acts that contributed to it and to relate them to other practices of
comparison. I have relied on three analyses in particular: one foregrounding racist
historical myths, Alison Des Forges, “The Ideology of Genocide,” Issue: A Journal of
Opinion 23 (1995): 44-47; one foregrounding a (broken) rights discourse, Mamdani,
When Victims Become Killers; and one foregrounding Rwanda’s ecological dead end,
Paul J. Magnarella, “The Background and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda,” Jour-
nal of International Criminal Justice 3 (2005): 801-22. Recovery is another issue alto-
gether. ForMamdani’s contrast between “victor’s justice” (whichblames theagents,
in the manner of de-Nazification) and “survivor’s justice” (which blames the sys-
tem, in the manner of de-Sovietization), see pp. 270-73.
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Diminishing, when comparison is carried out, and privileging, when
comparison is refused—it is worth pointing out once more that these
words for the untoward effects of comparing are terms for ethical
actions, drawn from the same realm as “good,” “evil,” “justice,” and the
like. They are not simply matters of fact, knowledge, or deduction.
Objects that are too far up or down the moral scale, absolute good and
absolute evil, defy comparison. Of course it takes a community to eval-
uate them on that scale, and a discordant group within that community
may respond differently to the prospect of comparison, thus putting
themselves farther out on the margins. Or an enterprising rhetorician
like Kayibanda can endeavor to burn half of the comparative bridge.
Comparison functions in the middle zone, where things are a mix of
good and bad or of self and other, and contact with what is polluting
or transcendent is not feared.
And, turning this assertion round, we can learn from comparisons
that are refused or suppressed where a public’s untouchable objects lie,
what it holds vile or sacred.1 The comparison of comparisons—of acts
1 In US politics, publishing, and academia, it would appear that “race” currently oc-
cupies the position of a non‐negotiable identity principle, an essence not to be rel-
ativized by comparisons, and “gender” has begun a decline from that position. The
causes and implications are obscure to me. Arguments against the validity of race
as an analytic category are certainly not lacking. As discussion and case‐in-point,
see Rebecca Tuvel, “In Defense of Transracialism,”Hypatia 32 (2017): 263-78, and the
symposium about that article’s repudiation by Hypatia’s editorial board in Philoso-
phy Today 62.1 (Winter 2018).
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of comparison deemed permissible or not by different publics—reveals
the structure of areas of discourse.
Under the name “the new Qing Imperial history,” a number of his-
torians, largely but not solely working in the United States, have drawn
parallels between the methods of conquest and stabilization used by
the China‐based Qing or Manchu dynasty (1644-1911) and those used by
the British in India and North America, the Russians in Siberia and the
Caucasus, and the Spanish in the NewWorld. Comparison reveals simi-
larities (known or unknown to the participants at the time) among these
empires’ military strategies, financial management, religious and cul-
tural interventions, patterns of settlement and land distribution, pop-
ulation control, communications, and so forth, alongside the inevitable
differences, for these were empires with distinct heritages operating
under conditions that could be vastly dissimilar. The work of Evelyn
Rawski, James Millward, Mark Elliott, and Peter Perdue, informed by
this comparative approach, teaches us a great deal about what it was
to be an empire in the era of cavalry and wooden ships. The Manchus,
originally a nomadic people from the steppes north of densely urban-
ized and intensively farmed China, broke through the Ming Dynasty’s
defenses at a moment of civil war and rapidly laid claim to that rich
empire whose subjects had come to think of themselves as belonging,
by and large, to a single ethnic and cultural group with a shared set of
norms and institutions knitting together the remotest townships in re-
lationships with the center. Not content with consolidating their rule
over the former Ming domain, the Manchus exploited their existing
familial, cultural, and religious affinity with Mongols and Tibetans to
extend a variable degree of dominance, ranging from alliances to pro-
tectorates, over an area of sparsely settled deserts, oases, and uplands
roughly equivalent in size to the provinces of Ming China. Where the
alliances frayed, the Qing sent in troops, and in a series of wars in
the middle and late eighteenth century conquered and resettled Cen-
tral Asian lands previously held by Zunghars, Uyghurs, and Turkestanis
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(with whom the Manchus had no historical ties).2 Conquest and reset-
tlement are basic components of any imperial history. It should sur-
prise no one that the Kangxi and Qianlong emperors, when they could,
expanded their domains. Integral to the process were, as well, bloody
extermination campaigns and forced migrations. Notably, it is histori-
ans able to use sources written in Manchu who have chronicled these
events and pieced together the rationale behind the larger geopolitical
strategy of the Qing, hence the label “NewQing Imperial History”—new
in that it relies on documents not previously exploited and treats this
early‐modern empire otherwise than as just one of the traditional 25
Chinese dynasties.The themes of conquest, non-Chinese ethnicity, and
strategies of imperial display seem to have hit a nerve among Chinese
historians, some of whom have written to denounce the whole school
of thought as an American campaign of denigration against China. To
compare the Qing dynasty with the Romanov or Ottoman dynasties, let
alone the British or French architects of empire, is according to this
critique to “view the history of China from an imperialist standpoint,
with imperialist points of view and imperialist eyes, regarding ‘tradi-
tional’ China as an ‘empire,’ regarding the Qing dynasty as ‘Qing dynasty
imperialism’[…]. The ‘New Qing History’ is academically absurd, and
politically does damage to the unity of China.”3 The last clause shows
2 See James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity and Empire in Qing Central
Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); James A.Millward, Ruth
W. Dunnell, Mark C. Elliott, and Philippe Forêt, eds., New Qing Imperial History: The
Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde (London: Routledge-Curzon, 2004); Pe-
ter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005). A lecture by Evelyn Rawski, then President
of the Association of Asian Studies, touched off the controversy about the degree
to which the Manchu rulers were or were not “Chinese” and how to evaluate their
“Chineseness”: see Rawski, “Presidential Address. Reenvisioning the Qing: The Sig-
nificance of the Qing Period in Chinese History,” Journal of Asian Studies 55 (1996):
829-950, and the rejoinder by Ping-Ti Ho, “In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of
Evelyn Rawski’s ‘Reenvisioning the Qing,’” Journal of Asian Studies 57 (1998): 123-55.
3 Li Zhiting, “Xuezhe ping ‘Xin Qing shi’: ‘Xindiguozhuyi’ shixue biaoben” (Scholars
Assess the “New Qing History”: A Specimen of Neoimperialistic Historiography),
Zhongguo shehui kexue wang (20 April 2015), available at http://www.cssn.cn/zx/
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where the hurt of comparison lies. Scholars in China are explicitly for-
bidden by current national‐security law to raise the question of territo-
rial unity. Discussing the events that led to the Western provinces and
Tibet being acquired by the Qing dynasty offends against the article
of faith proclaiming that those territories “have always been Chinese”
and must always be so.4 Worse yet, Uyghurs and Tibetans who “have
always been Chinese” might begin, if they read such histories, to think
of themselves as forcibly incorporated imperial subjects of recent date.
Since every schoolchild knows that China has always and only been the
victim of imperial aggression, and never conducted imperial wars of
its own, Qing history must obviously be held aloof from the dangers of
such comparison.5 Thus not rationally, but by raison d’état, scholars liv-
ing under Chinese jurisdictions are forbidden from exploring analogies
potentially relevant to understanding the growth of Qing empire, and
thus (is there any need to say it?) the world we live in today. Their site
is simply their situation.
Less peremptorily, fields of study are often constituted around a
particularly prestigious example, the implications of which rule out
other potentially informative examples. A case in point is postcolonial
studies, for which the British Empire and, secondarily, the French
overseas possessions serve as the model cases and the contemporary
American network of directly and indirectly controlled territories the
implied analogon.6 Relatively few publications in this field venture
201504/t20150420_1592588.shtml (accessed June 28, 2017); partial translation in
David Bandurski, “A Righteous View of History,” China Media Project (22 April
2015), available at http://chinamediaproject.org/2015/04/22/a‐righteous-view‐of-
history/ (accessed June 28, 2017).
4 On the heritage of nationalistic historiography in both Chinese and Russian official
scholarship on the region, see Perdue, China MarchesWest, pp. 506-17.
5 For a typical instance of these oft‐repeatedhalf‐truths, seeMengXiangqing, “China
Dream Includes Strong PLA,” China Daily (8 October 2013), available at http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-10/08/content_17012886_2.htm (accessed Octo-
ber 19, 2018).
6 Cf. Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq (Oxford: Black-
well, 2004), as cited in Stoler, “Preface,” Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power, pp.
x, xx, xxvi. When current international tensions determine what is to be studied
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into the history or culture of the Spanish or Portuguese empires, the
Russian, Ottoman, or Chinese empires, not to mention the Moghul,
Persian, Tibetan, Babylonian, Aztec, and other histories that fill the
worldwide record of humanity. (Historians and archaeologists attend
to them, of course; they just do not do so under the label “postcolonial.”)
Specialists have noted “a persistent undertone in the literature that
the only true forms of colonialism were European ones. All others—be
they Chinese, Japanese, or Russian—the argument seemed to be, were
not so much derivative of these forms but set aside as different from
them.”7 Inasmuch as the Chinese and Russian empires predate the
“true […] European ones,” the suggested characterizations of them as
either “derivative” or “different” indicates a deep unwillingness to read
the record. Just as with the worrying comparisons to the paradigmatic
genocide, here a leading example influences what will count as being
within and without a field to such an extent that many broader ques-
tions about what “empire” and “colony” are in general become hard to
frame. How far does the category of “empire in general” extend? What
are its requisites? Does it becomemeaningless when comparison strays
too far from the canonical cases? Is there perhaps in the prominence
accorded to the British in the Caribbean, India, and Africa a concern
that extending the range of examples will dilute the moral urgency of
anti‐imperialism? Or that empire will become just another thing that
happens, no matter by whom and how?
The nation, with its coordinated claims on citizenship, language,
economy, and culture, so imposes itself on our minds that it may seem
and compared under the heading of “empire,” the search for a usable past, as Van
Wyck Brooks called it, begins with representations of the present. Attempting to
take a segment of the past on its own terms is not “antiquarianism” (notoriously
trivialized by Nietzsche in “Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben”)
but a questioning of the agenda‐setting representations of the present and thus a
chance to learn from the past something other than what we put into it.
7 Carole McGranahan and Ann Laura Stoler, “Preface,” ix‐xii in Ann Laura Stoler, Car-
oleMcGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue, eds., Imperial Formations (Santa Fe: School for
Advanced Research Press, 2007), p. x. The collection is directed against this consen-
sus.
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the natural unit for historical comparisons. But empires tell us that it
is not so. Empires break nations and recombine them. Nations’ inde-
pendence from one empire, once gained, may break them again. Some
entities currently registered as nations are the remains of former em-
pires. Cooper and Bradbury’s broad survey of Empires in World History
corrects the view that the nation is the antidote to imperial dominance.
The relation is rather part‐to-part and interactive. “Empires do not grow
out of whole peoples who set out to dominate other whole peoples. The
Ottoman empire was not specifically Turkish, the Habsburg not specif-
ically Spanish. In both cases society was reshaped by the process of
empire‐building.”8 At the scale where these historians operate, no one
paradigmatic instance leads the investigation into empire. Rather, re-
current devices, variously combined, enable actors to imperialize. Em-
pires develop similar strategies, learn from one another, take over a
previous empire’s base of operation even down to the language of of-
ficial communication, which may be native to neither governors nor
governed. There is on the one hand an accumulated “toolkit” of meth-
ods—the “repertoires of imperial power”—and on the other the many
historical deployments of that ensemble. “One might call the European
empire‐builders of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Mon-
gols of the sea—their advantage was in mobility, the ability to concen-
trate resources, and military technology adapted to a particular situ-
ation. They moved in where they could and avoided areas where the
barriers were high.”9 The historians have learned from this mobility.
Moreover, their eclecticism is framed by an awareness of the tempta-
tion of “reading history backwards” and falsely generating necessary
truths out of mere opportunistic successes.10 A broadly comparative
history can accommodate neither singularity nor teleology. Its atten-
tion is drawn to preexisting conditions and the junctures that crystal-
8 Frederick Cooper and Jane Burbank, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics
of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 119.
9 Cooper and Burbank, Empires inWorld History, pp. 180, 151.
10 “It is only by readinghistory backwards that the story of theBritish empire appears
as the inevitable triumph of a British way of making empire or doing capitalism.”
Cooper and Burbank, Empires inWorld History, p. 170.
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lize them into patterns resistant to analysis only so long as the same
conditions continue in force. A longer history, a bigger geography, will
remind us of the dozens of empires that have come and gone on the
face of the earth—empires organized in various ways, on many scales,
empires on land and sea, on a spectrum running from genocidal plot
to informal cooperative agreement, empires more or less contested by
their subject populations, administered with more or less violence or
wisdom, eventually subverted fromwithin or invaded from the outside,
but having the shared feature of a communitarian division between rul-
ing and ruled populations, this division sometimes made tangible by
differences of language, sometimes of habitat, sometimes of education
or religion, sometimes of skin color, sometimes of dietary or aesthetic
practices; in any event, some differences that invite comparison. Every
empire compares; this is a tautological statement, inasmuch as every
empire deals with difference; but the range of variety in the examples
precludes rigorous or ostensive definition and calls for the “family re-
semblance” or “Lego set” model.11
Detienne’s program of “experimenting,” too, works through family
resemblance rather than essential or defining properties. Comparison
will be achieved not by putting whole cultures or institutions side‐by-
side but by breaking the narratives transmitted by national histories
down into such components as the dealer in anthropological compar-
isons can sort and recombine. Breaking and recombining, that is the
price of commensurability. Everyone’s idols must be melted down.
The three comparative sub‐programs in Detienne’s manifesto, “acts
of founding,” “practices of democracy,” and “the realm of polytheisms,”
were chosen, one surmises, partly on accidental, empirical grounds, but
nonetheless reflect obsessions of the Hellenist community to which De-
tienne primarily addresses himself: communitarian identity (and colo-
nization); the emergence of democracy; and political theology. Not con-
tent to break them down, Detienne’s group redistributes the spoils. It is
important, for iconoclastic purposes, to demonstrate that the elements
11 On “family resemblance” versus rigid categorization, see Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), pars. 66-68.
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of these traditional Greco-Roman idea‐complexes are found elsewhere,
in Japan, India, Senegal, or Peru; that their specific combination is op-
tional, not obligatory; and that the elements by no means imply one
another by inner necessity, but emerge in the wake of specific historical
constraints.
Detienne is, of course, operating as a critic of claims of cultural
uniqueness. But to take the decentering one step farther, we might
ask questions about civilizational complexes in which other themes and
mechanisms dominate. It is good to start with alien proxies for Athe-
nian democracy, that Incomparable whichDetienne stubbornly subjects
to comparative analysis, but is the priority placed on the effort to re-
verse a Eurocentric idol not a concession, in its way, to Eurocentrism?
Could not other comparables be taken as starting points, comparables
without such prominence in the standard origin‐stories derived from
Greece, Rome, and company?
We might for example take up our comparative study from the duo
of ruler andminister, a political formula essential to most early Chinese
writing about political order, which allows through its many quasi‐his-
torical permutations the development of a many‐sided philosophy of
enlightened rule, whether Daoist, Legalist, Mohist, or Confucian. We
see in the encyclopedic legends of early China the wise minister sub-
stituting for the disabled sovereign, the wise minister rejected by the
headstrong king, the minister who refuses to serve, the king who will
not take no for an answer, the king who abdicates in favor of the min-
ister, legitimation crises provoked by the revolt of subordinates, and, of
course, emollient discourses tending to show that each of these devel-
opments was necessary and beneficial in the long run.The motif‐group
holds through myth, legend, ritual, and history.12 Even without exit-
12 For representative analyses of these motifs in a comparative framework, see
Michael Puett, The Ambivalence of Creation: Debates Concerning Innovation and Arti-
fice in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Yuri Pines, “Friends
or Foes: Changing Concepts of Ruler-Minister Relations and the Notion of Loyalty
in Pre-Imperial China,”Monumenta Serica 50 (2002): 35-74; Mark Edward Lewis, The
Flood Myths of Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).
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ing the envelope of Chinese culture, we are within our rights to ask:
What are the components of the ruler‐minister duo, what are its conse-
quences, how does it write itself large in institutions or fall apart when
the protagonists behave in unsanctioned ways? How deeply is the Chi-
nese empire, as an ideological and practical formation, imprinted by an
imagination of kingship divided into advisory and executive functions?
And going farther afield, how would the same duality, as intensively
theorized by ancient Chinese thinkers, help us understand European,
Mesopotamian, or Mesoamerican texts? Here the comparison is acti-
vated by one classic formation to which we may or may not find that
anything in European myth or history quite answers, or corresponds
with equal prominence. To recenter comparison in this way is, inas-
much as we break with long‐held habits, to decenter it.
Indeed, if we look at Europe with Chinese history as our standard,
we will find ourselves asking questions that Europeans did not usually
ask of themselves. The task is not to compare Europe and China, but to
compare Europe to China, on Chinese terms. Why is the transmission
of the Europeans’ so‐called Classics so often interrupted, so fragmen-
tary and so biased? Why are their languages so provincial in space and
time?Why is the literary canon so sparse, heterogeneous, and unstable?
Why do they have so few institutions that hold up for more than a few
hundred years? Why did they not set up a proper examination system
or civil service until a thousand or so years after the principle had been
demonstrated to succeed in China? How did specialists in the super-
natural come to wield such unregulated power for so long? After a few
decades spent in the company of Chinese books, it seems normal to me
to be Chinese, and exotic to be European; to be American, downright
improbable. Which is not to say that “normal” stops comparison from
happening.

Near and Far
Victor Segalen—China scholar, poet, novelist, art historian—puts a
classically inept comparative analysis in the mouth of the businessman
and habitué of consulates who is the narrator of his novel René Leys. On
October 11, 1911, receiving news of a rebellion in the South, the narrator
goes excitedly to his friend, the title character, to learn what the Qing
government’s response will be. René Leys, supposedly on intimate
terms with the imperial inner circle, is dismissive.The narrator accepts
his indifference as a proof of the dynasty’s sublimely assured control,
and reflects in his diary:
Why indeed should I have been so bothered by this exotic Sun Yat‐sen,
as much a “negro” for the impassive Chinese of theWei River Valley or
the pallid Manchurian conqueror as would be aWolof-Arab half‐caste
raising hell inDakar, when the imperial power is enthroned atDunkirk
and wears a Norwegian face!1
Trying to understand China as another Europe (plus colonies),
Segalen’s narrator maps onto it the features of his familiar world:
the pale‐skinned peoples of the North have wealth, military might, and
cultural authority; and the South is full of darkish, mongrel, rebellious
but ultimately inconsequential “negroes.” The first irony to be lost on
this narrator is the fact that the “exotic” Sun (a Cantonese‐speaker
1 Victor Segalen, René Leys (Paris: Crès, 1922), pp. 209-10. Segalen’s writing is
through‐and-through comparative, but his main contribution to comparative the-
ory is Essai sur l’exotisme: Une esthétique du divers (written 1904-18, first published in
1955; reprinted, Paris: Fata Morgana, 1978).
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long resident in Honolulu) and his associates will in a matter of days
overthrow the vast and venerable Qing empire. The second is that
China is not organized like Europe at all: the Frenchman’s projection
of the salient features of empire (for him, a racial pecking order that
correlates with latitude and wealth) gets wrong such features of Chi-
nese regionalism as the effects of centuries of internal migration, the
concentration of wealth in the southern cities, the ladder of promo-
tion through the nationwide examination system, and efforts by the
imperial center in every age to scatter the accumulation of riches and
influence by aristocratic families. There is inequality in China, only not
the racial‐regional kind that the Frenchman is primed to recognize.
The translation yields a singularly stupid political analysis.
Segalen’s novel is an unusual double “unreliable narrator” game: the
narrator, who understands nothing, is throughout strung along by the
title character, a pathological liar with self‐aggrandizing tendencies and
a gift for languages. All this happens against the background of the
Qing‐era Forbidden City, universally thought to be a dark wood of puz-
zles and mysteries. In this passage, at least, the message to be read
seems clear: the truth is the opposite of what the narrator thinks. Un-
like the French republic‐cum-empire, the Chinese empire does collect
its provinces into one continuous body, with many perceptible differ-
ences being politically insignificant or even compensated for. Among
historical figures mentioned in the novel, the reformist leader of 1898,
Kang Youwei, rose from amiddling Cantonese town to hold the empire’s
highest offices; the general, later president and then briefly self‐des-
ignated emperor Yuan Shikai came from Hunan; Sun Yat‐sen’s back-
ers were, like him, southern merchants and emigrants. Being from the
South or Center was no barrier to social ascent.
Like the United States, China has a large number of identified
minority groups and a vast group that does not think of itself as
being “marked,” as the linguists say, but rather as the mainstream: as
“Chinese,” or if relevant as “Han Chinese.” “The Han Chinese constitute
more than 90% of China’s population and nearly a fifth of the human
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species.”2 One can live as “Han Chinese” for all intents and purposes
while remaining aware of one’s family origins as Manchu, Muslim,
Miao, and so forth; most of the minorities of China are not visibly
distinct from the majority population, and surnames, clothing, region
of residence and the like do not serve as reliable proxies for ethnic
identity. Except in the application of certain policies (like the now‐de-
funct one‐child rule), ethnicity plays a minor role in daily life for most
people. The analogous category in American life would be “white,”
an umbrella identity covering many pasts (English, Irish, German,
Slovak, Italian, Greek, Swedish, and so on) and a range of phenotypes.
Whiteness is unmarked (the default option) in America in the sense
that one rarely hears of a banker, a poet, or an engineer described as a
white banker, poet, or engineer, but an article about a notable Black,
Chicano, Asian, etc., banker, poet, or engineer would be far more
likely to include overt mention of ethnicity (and, with some variation
depending on fields of activity, gender).3 Except where ethnicity affects
the application of certain policies, “Chinese” in China may for the
most part be assumed to be equivalent to “Han Chinese.” This is not to
discount casual folk prejudice against certain descent groups, accents,
and regional origins; still, an assumption of uniformity in customs,
family structures, lifestyle, relation to the law, citizenship, and so forth
prevails. And as elsewhere, this uniformity among the unmarked popu-
lation results from long‐term broad historical processes of assimilation
(much longer‐term than in the US case). Assimilation, integration,
or sinification resulted from the expansion of a particular cultural
and ethnic group, retrospectively known as the Huaxia, and their
subsequently recruited congeners over some three thousand years of
history from their places of origin to other areas of what is now China.
2 Jieming Chen et al., “Genetic Structure of the Han Chinese Population Revealed by
Genome‐wide SNP Variation,” American Journal of HumanGenetics 85 (2009): 775-85.
3 On the Jakobsonian concept of markedness, see Linda R. Waugh, “Marked and Un-
marked: A Choice Between Unequals,” Semiotica 38 (1982): 299-318. On the limits of
analogies between Han‐ness and whiteness as categories, see Susan D. Blum, Por-
traits of ‘Primitives’: Ordering Human Kinds in the Chinese Nation (Lanham, Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp. 57-59.
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Cultural and ethnic, because integral to Huaxia cultural norms were rules
about marriage, naming, place of residence, style of subsistence and
the like: these had secondary effects on the biology of the population
(who was born into what sorts of family, having what kinds of relations
to other lineages and groups) as well as their consciousness (morals,
relation to the state, aptitude for military service or competition for
official rank, and so forth). Ethos and ethnos are intertwined. One
often hears that participation in Chinese culture makes one (or one’s
descendants) Chinese. As Mencius put it in about 300 BCE, “[The
legendary culture‐hero] Shun was born in Zhufeng, went to live in
Fuxia, and died in Mingtiao—a man of the Eastern Yi [tribes]. [The
founder of the Zhou Dynasty] KingWen was born near Mount Qi in the
Zhou territory and died in Biying—a man of the Western Yi [tribes]”.4
Despite their alien origins, says Mencius, both Shun and Wen became
sage‐kings and founders of Chinese civilization. Mencius’s argument
for culture, not race, as the defining feature of Chineseness may have
been an innovation in his time (this is debated), but its acceptance
certainly kept Han identity open to new entrants.
The success of this long‐term process of assimilation may be seen
in what Chen et al. call “a continuous gradient” of population variance
from north to south, “instead of distinct subpopulation clusters.”5 Peo-
ple whose remote ancestors may have known themselves as Yi, Yue, or
some other rival to the Huaxia lost the sense of difference following the
expansions, violent or peaceful as might be the case, that enlarged the
empire. As with whiteness in America, there were advantages to being
Han. But an unmarked identity conceals a forgotten one. It is a long
4 Mencius, 4b29. The word yi was often translated “barbarian” and even put under
diplomatic taboo in the era of strife between imperial China and expansionist
Western powers. See Lydia Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Mod-
ernWorldMaking (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 32-42. On
models of Chinese ethnicity as open or closed, cultural or genetic, see Yuri Pines,
“Beasts orHumans: Pre-Imperial Origins of the ‘Sino-Barbarian’ Dichotomy,” 59-102
in ReuvenAmitai andMichal Biran, eds.,Mongols, Turks, andOthers: EurasianNomads
and the SedentaryWorld (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
5 Chen et al., “Genetic Structure of the Han Chinese,” p. 781.
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time since the Yue or Dong Yi raised their collective heads, and there is
no reason for them to do so now, but one should remember that not all
of China was always Han. Nor, today, do all citizens of China identify
as “Chinese.”
In any society that prides itself on assimilation, the unmarked iden-
tity is the strong one, the identity that is precisely not a particular iden-
tity but tends to present itself as universal and normative. And if so-
cial promotion erases the mark of difference, it is easy to think of the
mark of difference as a badge of inferiority. Yet some marked identities
remain as lumps in the melting pots of any culture. Around them de-
velop areas of difficulty, of non‐universality, of semantic restriction (the
“rights of woman” being, for example, long treated as an optional coda
to the universal and aspirational “rights of man”; “hyphenated identi-
ties” being inherently suspicious). A transition to unmarked status may
be legally required yet not completed in the minds of all: thus from a
legal point of view, once “gay marriage” has been signed into law it is
simply “marriage”; but a great many people refuse to recognize that
non‐difference. Or the naturalized citizen, legally a full participant in
citizenship, may be required to show her identity card more often than
the native‐born, and have to listen to strangers and politicians suggest-
ing that she “go back where she came from.”The asymmetry of marked
and unmarked designations makes it seem as if the unmarked have the
right to demand compliance and integration from the marked, those
people who “stick out” in some way. The marked are always being com-
pared with the norm. Comparison rarely breaks in on the tranquility of
the unmarked.6
Assimilation is the acquisition of an unmarked identity. But assim-
ilation—or even a cultural form of integration—did not happen on its
own, in China as elsewhere. Consider these passages from a Ming‐dy-
nasty encyclopedia of statecraft, the Daxue yanyi bu (Supplement to an Ex-
pansive Commentary on the “Great Learning”) by Qiu Jun (1421-95). Address-
6 ThusWayne Brekhus, “A Sociology of the Unmarked: Redirecting Our Focus,” Socio-
logical Theory 16 (1998): 34-51, recommends “reverse marking” the ordinary and the
conventional as a way to “deghettoize the marked” (pp. 43-44, 48).
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ing his sovereign throughout, Qiu Jun compiles an operating manual
for the empire. He writes a century or so after the reconquest of China
from the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty, so spreading Chineseness is verymuch
his concern. In one chapter he takes up the emperor’s responsibility to
“broaden moral teaching in order to change customs”, in the words of
the chapter’s title. Why is teaching necessary at all?
I note: Governing is the ruler’s business. That which makes govern-
ment necessary is the people. The one who puts into practice the
ruler’s policies and brings the people into conformity with them is
the official. Governing comes down to two principles: administering
and teaching. […] Although the root of teaching is found […] in the
sovereign […] yet just as the earth does not consist in one quarter only,
but includes distant regions that are hard of access, so too humanity
is not all of one kind, but includes remote and diverse groups that
are hard to understand. For this reason, when a wise ruler comes to
occupy the throne, he knows that moral transformation is the most
urgent task of governing. […] This is the basis on which the world can
be made peaceful; everything else is a consequence of it.7
Qiu Jun is no anarchist. The people are raw material, recalcitrant and
unruly.The rulermustwork on them through the official, his designated
instrument, managing sustenance, rewards and punishments, and dis-
pensing doctrine. “Remote and diverse” groups have not been worked
over by emperors and officials for as long, so they will require more en-
ergetic “transformation” than those close to home; this is self‐evident
to Qiu.
The common people, being common people, include those of greater
and lesser attainment, as well as good and bad elements. The ac-
complished shall be given marks of distinction, in order to separate
them from the unaccomplished. The unaccomplished should also be
7 Qiu Jun,Daxueyanyi bu, juan82, item31d, inWenyuangeSikuquanshu (TheComplete
Collection of Books in Four Categories,Manuscript Kept in the Tower of Literary Pro-
fundity). I have used the version posted online at www.ctext.org : https://ctext.org/
library.pl?if=gb&res=6336 (accessed June 23, 2015).
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marked with distinctions, in order that they shall not mix with the
accomplished. With these distinctions in place, one can encourage
those with a potential for becoming good and bring them into service,
while the inferior ones can know the basis for shame and praise, so
that they too will improve themselves and become good: this is what
is called “advancing the good and inducing the rest to follow.”8
The official must contend with cultural diversity in several forms: level
of education (or indoctrination), ethnicity, religion, etc. Ideally, none of
these forms of diversity should exist. They are not valuable for them-
selves. Working on this population, the official distributes “marks” of
approval and disapproval. The random diversity of the pre‐transforma-
tion populace now sorts into two definite groups, the “accomplished”
(that is, those who conform to the official’s standards for learning and
behavior) and the “less accomplished.” The accomplished will be put on
the path to success and visibility, the less accomplished left as they are.
The double difference drawn in the Ming official’s sententious
prose amounts to an equivalence between two types of differentiating
comparison. Comparison happens on both territorial and conceptual
grounds, these being reconciled by the identification of the center with
the norm. There are those who can be taught and those who cannot;
and there are those who are close to the throne, easier to teach, and
those who are farther away, harder to teach. Qiu Jun offers remedies
for both kinds of imperfection: reforming character and suppressing
bad customs. In this way the empire is maintained and extended by
officials carrying out the ruler’s will (for, as Qiu Jun observes, the ruler
cannot be everywhere simultaneously). A few examples taken from
history illustrate Qiu Jun’s concerns:
Under the Song Dynasty, when Han Qi [1008-75] was in charge of
Bingzhou [i.e., Taiyuan in Shanxi province], the customs east of the
river were a mixture of Jiang and Yi ways. They cremated their dead.
Qi had a field purchased and ordered a stele to be inscribed with a
8 Qiu Jun, Daxue yanyi bu, juan 82, item 2d.
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proclamation, ordering people to bring their dead to be buried there.
From that point, to cremate the dead was considered a shame.
I note: In ancient times China did not know the custom of burn-
ing corpses. It came from theWestern Regions with the Buddha. For a
son to tolerate his parent’s body and spirit to be thrown onto a flaming
pyre is the ultimate lack of filiality. As magistrate, Qi had the power to
forbid it. Today this practice still exists among the people, but it is not
something that orders and punishments are powerless to stop. I re-
quest an order subjecting all persons who break the law against phys-
ical destruction of their parents to legal prosecution, and those who
light the fires should be liable as well: this will be a sign of respect for
filiality and of honor for reformed customs.9
Feng Hui of the Later Wei became Reminder of Anzhou [Hebei
province], where the mountaineers were extremely unrefined. Fa-
thers, sons and traveling strangers all slept in one room.Hui got off his
horse and urged them to find separate places. Their custom changed
instantly.
I note: This is still the custom today in the Yellow River Valley
[Henan province], where the people have been contaminated by
Jurchen and Mongol habits. They still sleep on a single heated brick
bed. The job of transforming them is a big one. This behavior should
be strenuously prohibited.10
Consider the territory of China a communications network. As (in an-
other culture) all roads lead to Rome, so here, all ways are meant to
lead to the Way laid down by the sages and presently enforced by the
sovereign. The local official is a relay in this communications system.
He observes, compares, and corrects. Qiu Jun’s readiness to see in the
population a raw material for transformation imprints on them a pri-
mary difference which it is the task of every official to reduce as far as
9 Qiu Jun, Daxue yanyi bu, juan 82, item 26.
10 Qiu Jun, Daxue yanyi bu, juan 82, item 20.
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possible.Thousands of such officials correcting the behavior of the peo-
ple they administer, “advancing the good and inducing the rest to fol-
low,” should eventually cause the whole population to lose their marks
of faulty behavior, their Jiang, Yi, Buddhist, Mongol, selfish, criminal,
or other untoward customs. The message sent out from the center will
one day be relayed back with perfect fidelity, unmarked, self‐transpar-
ent. That is Qiu Jun’s educational utopia. I see no difference with clas-
sic colonial pedagogy. Is it more than a technicality that in his manual
rulers and ruled are (becoming) members of the “same” state? Before
the invasions and campaigns that gave the New Qing History its object,
the Ming were energetically reforming away the alien qualities, inborn
or acquired, of their subjects. Of such conversions are unmarked ma-
jorities made.
As “empire” has become a term of abuse, considerations of national
honor preclude applying it to one’s own polity: Detienne’s “incompara-
ble” again. But let us risk a parallel. Wherein lies the main difference
between a fairly successful empire, like China, and repudiated ones like
those of France, Great Britain, and Japan? It may lie, not in the meth-
ods, not in the populations, not in the geography, but in the results of
the long‐term effort to suppress and absorb opposition and thereby to
secure the forgetfulness that alone can naturalize domination as be-
longing. “Forgetfulness, and I would even say historical error,” said Re-
nan, “is an essential factor in the forming of a nation […] No French
citizen knows today if he is Burgundian, Alanian, Tayfal, or Visigoth.”11
It is probably not an accident, but certainly convenient, that it be so.
And it was neither an accident nor inconvenient that every inhabitant
of French Algeria, Senegal, or Indochina knew exactly what tribe he or
she belonged to.
11 Ernest Renan, Qu’est‐ce qu’une nation? (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1882), pp. 7, 9.

AMuseum Without Walls for
Walls Without a Museum
Spurred by the imminent relocation of the Preussischer Kulturbesitz’s
ethnographic collections from suburban Dahlem to the Humboldt-
Forum in central Berlin, a 2017-18 exhibition at the Bode-Museum
bears the title “Unvergleichlich,” or as the museum’s English‐language
publicity materials call it, “Beyond Compare.” The Bode-Museum,
opened in 1904, houses Byzantine, medieval, Renaissance and baroque
sculpture chiefly from Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries. “Un-
vergleichlich,” an exhibit dispersed throughout the display of the its
permanent collection, pairs sculptures from the Africa collections of
the Ethnologisches Museum with Madonnas, saints, condottieri and
mythological figures from Europe. The exhibition’s organizers observe:
The act of comparing and identifying is […] not neutral, but charged
with socially definedprejudices, conventions, and constructionsofhis-
tory. It is also governed by the experiences of the individuals who draw
the comparisons.Defining two things as similar or different is often re-
lated to power. The process of comparison is thus closely tied to ques-
tions of collection history, aesthetics, colonialism, and gender. The ex-
hibition and the accompanying appwill illuminate these themes from
a variety of perspectives.1
1 Introductory text posted at https://www.smb.museum/museen‐und-einrich-
tungen/bode‐museum/ausstellungen/detail/unvergleichlich‐kunst-aus‐afrika-
im-bode‐museum.html (accessed October 9, 2018); similar content is displayed
as a wall text at the entry to the exhibition (“Kunst aus Afrika im Bode-Museum:
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Viewers are thus invited to reflect on their “socially defined prejudices,
conventions, and constructions of history.” As with every lesson plan,
too obviously telegraphing the right answermay backfire.One imagines
an appropriate exit survey, designed to identify the rare viewer whom
the juxtaposition of African and European art objects will scandalize. I
can almost see a leaflet in the following form:
Were the art objects exhibited together
O comparable (1)
O not comparable (2)?
 
If you answered “comparable,” please give the basis of your reasoning:
O ethical (1.1)
O aesthetic (1.2)
If you answered “not comparable,” please give the basis of your reasoning:
O ethical (2.1)
O aesthetic (2.2)
 
Those who find the combination of works acceptable on either eth-
ical or aesthetic grounds (1) are the easy subjects for our investigation
into comparability. The “ethical” option (1.1) connotes the need of any
self‐respecting modern European museum viewer or curator to honor
the cosmopolitan principle of the dignity of all human beings and to
Ausstellungstexte”). See also the catalogue by Julien Chapuis, Jonathan Fine and
Paola Ivanov, Unvergleichlich: Kunst aus Afrika im Bode-Museum (Berlin: Staatliche
Museen zu Berlin / Preußischer Kulturbesitz, 2017), esp. pp. 10-13. On the issues
of cultural memory raised by the plan to move the ethnographic collections to
the future Humboldt-Forum on the site formerly occupied by the Stadtschloss
and then the Palast der Republik, see Thomas Thiemeyer, “Cosmopolitanizing
Colonial Memories in Germany,” Critical Inquiry 45 (2019): 967-990. For a positive
presentation of the new museum center, see Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz
(collective author), Das Humboldt-Forum im Berliner Schloss: Planungen, Prozesse,
Perspektiven (Berlin: Hirmer, 2013).
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acknowledge the effects of centuries of colonial dominance (thus one
“ought” as a good citizen to say that a Benin statue is as worthy of at-
tention as a Bernini one, even if one is poorly equipped to name the
fine points of one or the other, and although such recognition does lit-
tle to repair the damage of conquest and underdevelopment); the “aes-
thetic” option (1.2) connotes the power ascribed to works of art since,
say, Malraux’s Museum Without Walls, of transcending their contexts of
production and speaking to everyone universally (thus one “ought” to
be open to the art of all times, places and peoples, in order to be a gen-
uine art lover). These are unproblematic assumptions; their diffusion
shows how deeply the work of comparison has penetrated into the life
of pluralistic societies. My guess is that, being thus informed by prior
education, at least half the visitors would check the boxmarked “compa-
rable” and then offer aesthetic or ethical grounds for doing so, perhaps
with a 50-50 distribution but not much divergence in motive; overlap
among the answers can also be expected, some visitors checking both.
Those who find the works “not comparable” (2) will be more challenging
to explain. Are they the marks so easily trolled by Chris Ofili’s Madonna
adorned with elephant dung (probably a 2.1 response)?2 Or are they the
recalcitrant viewers for whom (2.2) African art is very fine in its place
but will never rival the holiness, the beauty, the nobility of a Raphael
Madonna, vel sim.? Will they, rather, have accepted the profound other-
ness of African art and learned to respect it as something they will never
quite understand—a form of piety, or tact (2.1), that risks discounting
the sensory and affective power of artworks and keeping the foreign
culture at arm’s length? Or will they be the really difficult customers
for whom African art can be fully meaningful only when its entire rit-
ual and social context is preserved around it (2.1=2.2), and for whom the
very institution of museums smacks of profanation? For this last group,
display in a Berlin temple of the beautiful is no sign of acceptance and
2 Andrew Russeth, “Chris Ofili’s ‘Holy Virgin Mary’ Goes to MoMA, A Gift from Steve
Cohen,” Artnews, 18 April 2018, available at http://www.artnews.com/2018/04/18/
chris‐ofilis-holy‐virgin-mary‐goes-moma‐gift-steve‐cohen/ (accessed October 8,
2018).
94 Are We Comparing Yet?
honor. They are not, like the obviously chauvinistic group, reluctant to
accept the African works on their merits (merits which European au-
diences might require some retraining to appreciate), they come to the
exhibit with different ideas of merit, of display, of recognition. Com-
parison will find dialogue with them the most difficult (and therefore
most valuable), because this group has not accepted the protocols of cos-
mopolitan art or culture appreciation. In any case, the language of the
museum’s address to the public does not anticipate people with particu-
larly restrictive cultural allegiances coming forward. It assumes that, if
they have come to the museum at all, they have accomplished the tran-
sition into the state of would‐be ethical and aesthetic cosmopolitans,
of people for whom comparisons can be valid. Thus the exhibition’s ti-
tle, “Unvergleichlich,” and its cover graphic (a collage of European and
African sculptural faces, bisected, recombined, and covered over with
an X in vandalistic, graffiti‐inspired bright‐pink ink) is a ventriloquized
evocation of a scandal that, they may observe with satisfaction, is not
real for them at all.
For me at least the rhetoric of the exhibit catalogue overstates the
challenge. Few will deny, at least on the plane of expressed sentiments
and good intentions, that African and European works of art are “com-
parable,” in terms of aesthetic or human value, and few will hold that
they are interchangeable. The catalogue thus rehearses a scandal that
no one finds scandalous, in a good‐natured game where we role‐play
our uncle from the countryside, the one who’s not sure that Africans
are capable of making art. But even in highlighting the differences in
cultural prestige between the one and the other collection we might be
overstating the case, for it appears that the African and Asian objects in
the (Königliches) Museum für Völkerkunde endured the Nazi years and
the war under relatively good conditions of preservation and appreci-
ation. As far as I have been able to tell by consulting lists of personnel
and exhibition materials, the objects of the Ethnological Museum were
not even then used to illustrate the racial inferiority of their makers,
nor were they displayed in significantly different ways after the Mu-
seum’s directorship had passed in 1934 to Hermann Baumann, an NS-
DAP party member who had studied with Frobenius. The famous “En-
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tartete Kunst” (“Degenerate Art”) traveling exhibit, made up of confis-
catedmodernist artworks held to demonstrate the depravity of “Bolshe-
vik” art movements, included many works containing images of black
men and women, a thematic choice that the organizers took to demon-
strate a falling‐back into primitive states of mind, but these were by
Max Beckmann, Ludwig Kirchner, Max Pechstein, Else Lasker-Schüler,
Ottomar Starke…—no one whose work would have been eligible for dis-
play in an Ethnological Museum.3 And there seems to have been little if
no mutual exchange between the Ethnological Museum and its Dahlem
neighbor, the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut for Race Science and Human Ge-
netics, directed by Eugen Fischer, another of Baumann’s teachers, to
whom goes the responsibility for (among other things) having hundreds
of mixed‐race offspring of German women and French colonial soldiers
in the occupied Rhineland sterilized.4 Theworks of African art, through
all this, seem to have been maintained free of ignominy. To what this
consideration is due I am not sure, but it is likely that the tradition of
granting works of art (no matter how exotic) disinterested contempla-
tion in an elevated setting sheltered these works from the more violent
comparisons which filled Nazi posters, brochures, books, and newspa-
pers.This said, the popular image of African art was libelous. One of the
“Entartete Kunst” exhibit’s best‐known advertising posters, by Rudolf
Herrmann, indeed put an African sculpted head cheek by jowl with an
exaggerated stereotype of the “Jew.”5 But it is not clear that Herrmann
3 See Freie Universität Berlin, Database “Entartete Kunst,” available at http://
www.geschkult.fu‐berlin.de/en/e/db_entart_kunst/index.html (accessed October
21, 2018).
4 See Hans-Walter Schmuhl, The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human
Heredity, and Eugenics, 1927–1945: Crossing Boundaries (Heidelberg: Springer, 2008),
esp. pp. 224-25.
5 Poster from the Chemnitz, 1937, installation of “Entartete Kunst,” in the collection
of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, reproduced at https://collections.lacma.
org/node/207913 (accessed October 24, 2018). However, in Thomas Thiemeyer’s
assessment, the growth of ethnological museums at roughly the same time as
museums of German history and art worked to “stabilize the self‐image with a
corresponding opposite”: Thiemeyer, “Kulturerbe als ‘Shared Heritage’? (I): Kolo-
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had copied an actual African sculpture or consulted any ethnographic
collections.
The catalogue of “Unvergleichlich” gives the works the best form
of homage: detailed, perceptive analysis. But the installation does not
quite overcome the character of a publicity stunt. Cosmopolitanism
wins an easy victory, unchallenged. (Not that I am calling for a prej-
udiced response; there is plenty of racism to go around already.) But
the African works are clearly guests in a European house. They are rel-
atively few; they always appear paired with a European work, which
suggests that their presence must always be specially motivated; each
pairing is marked by stand‐out colored didactic cards. Marked in the
semiotic sense too: for is it not the essence of being unmarked to be at
home in (one’s) world? The protective aura of cosmopolitanism which
underwrites their presence seems designed to remind the viewer that
equality and dignity in their modern philosophical form (chiefly Kan-
tian) are notions often credited to the European Enlightenment—an-
other house in which non-Europeans are not always made to feel at
home. Does the exhibit celebrate its own success a bit too much?6 The
sweetness of concord is always threatening to turn over into the sour-
ness of hypocrisy. Does one get to wear the title of cosmopolitan while
staying where and as one was, or is a more demanding passage through
otherness required?
The status of marked and unmarked are both thrown into promi-
nence and somewhat destabilized by this exhibit. It is as if the Eu-
ropeanness of the medieval statues, taken for granted in the ordinary
course of days at the Bode-Museum, takes on a new, marked status by
being invited to dance with the African statues. One had not noticed
nialzeitliche Sammlungen und die Zukunft einer europäischen Idee,” Merkur 829
(2018): 30-44, p. 39.
6 I may be missing the point. It is possible that the exhibit is defensive in spirit—a
preemptive rebuttal to arguments that the Humboldt-Forum can never get clear
of the racist past of its predecessor institutions. See again Thiemeyer, “Cos-
mopolitanizing Colonial Memories in Germany,” and the website http://www.
berlin‐postkolonial.de (accessed October 24, 2018).
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the polychrome skin, hair, and eyes in quite the same way, or the of-
ten off‐balance stances of the European figures. Such characteristics
no longer simply belong to the set of attributes that you expect to see in
a room of sculptures at the Bode-Museum.Theworks from a number of
different African kingdoms throw into relief a Euro‐specificity. But the
cosmopolitan aesthetic that has brought them together is not, itself,
marked, because it has no answering aesthetic program from Africa
or anywhere else; it is just a sort of necessary ethical and artistic back-
ground to the encounter. If, however, “Europe” is somehow being judged
for its hospitality to art, ideas, and people from elsewhere—a pending
case that the exhibition’s title “Unvergleichlich” pretends to answer in
the negative while of course affirming it resoundingly—then “Europe”
occupies two places in the scene of judgment, and such situations al-
ways raise the suspicion of self‐dealing. The Klansman, too, wanted to
be just one among many marked “races” in one part of his drama of
self‐presentation, and yet, in another part of that drama, also to occupy
the consensual position vested with the authority to decide what is fair
and normal. Unmarked whiteness, in that scene, would give marked
whiteness a free pass. But can an identity legitimately figure both as
framework and as object? Does not a conflict of interest vitiate the re-
sults? Something of Russell’s paradox (or Groucho’s) disturbs the seren-
ity of judgment here.
Despite these equivocations, the “Unvergleichliche” exhibit does
stage a break in the European exclusivity of the collection, a contrast
whereby the unmarked begins to see that it might be marked. It tests
universalism, even if it must do so through the device of the exception
(in the terms of the hoary example: the Ethiopian whose teeth are
white).7
7 The example, brought forth by Aristotle in Soph. El. (Sophistical Refutations) 167a10,
reappears in Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Martin Luther: see Richard Cross,
The Metaphysics of the Incarnation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.
195-204.

Making Room
With their “narcissism of small differences” and their quickness to as-
sume the worst about each other (see the Greek debt crisis, Brexit, etc.),
are today’s Europeans the right people to answer the call of Syrians or
Africans escaping their broken countries? What are the chances of cos-
mopolitanism rising from what we might call (without apocalypticism,
please) the ashes of Europe? In a parallel conundrum: inasmuch as re-
ligion divides what cosmopolitanism tries to bring together, how do
we conceive of secularism in a way that does not presuppose the path
taken by formerly Christian countries to get there?1 These questions,
bound up with comparability, commensurability, and justice, are not
new. Between the end of the Second World War and the independence
of Algeria, the question of post‐colonial, post‐racist justice threads its
way through the work of Sartre, Fanon, and Lévi-Strauss.Through their
mutual attacks, an awareness grows that the perspective from which to
situate universalism and its discontents is missing.
1 See Talal Asad,Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and SabaMahmood, Is Critique Secular?
Blasphemy, Injury,andFreeSpeech (NewYork: FordhamUniversity Press, 2013). A simi-
lar discussion about Enlightenment theories of equality and inherent human rights
opposes historianswho seeHaiti’s independence struggle as the fulfillment of oth-
erwise “truncated” ideals and thosewho find that a convenient alibi for false univer-
salism. See Samuel Moyn, “On the Non-Globalization of Ideas,” 187-204 in Samuel
Moyn and Andrew Sartori eds., Global Intellectual History (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2013). In both cases the particular historical origin of a norm is op-
posed to its purported universal applicability and said to limit it.
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It begins in the immediate postwar. Fascism is temporarily con-
tained, but the Allies hang onto their colonies, an obvious contradic-
tion. Looking forward to worldwide liberation from the constraints of
race and class, Sartre in 1948 predicts the erasure of distinctions of color
through the action of black poets, statesmen, workers, rebels:
The negro cannot deny that he is negro, nor can he claim that he is part
of some abstract colorless humanity: he is black. Thus he has his back
up against the wall of authenticity: having been insulted and formerly
enslaved, he picks up the word “nigger” which was thrown at him like
a stone, he draws himself erect and proudly proclaims himself a black
man, face to face with whitemen. The unity which will come together,
bringing all oppressed peoples together in the same struggle,must be
preceded in the colonies by what I shall call themoment of separation
or negativity: this anti‐racist racism is the only road that will lead to
the abolition of racial differences. How could it be otherwise?2
The negro […] asserts his solidarity with the oppressed of every
color. After that, the subjective, existential, ethnic notion of negritude
“passes,” as Hegel says, into that which one has of the proletariat: ob-
jective, positive and precise. […] In fact, Negritude appears as the un-
accented beat [le temps faible] of a dialectical progression […] But this
negative moment is not sufficient in itself, and these black men who
use it know this perfectly well; they know that it aims at preparing the
synthesis or realization of the human being in a raceless society. Thus
Negritude is for destroying itself; it is a “crossing to” and not an “arrival
at,” a means and not an end.3
Sartre welcomed the soon‐to-be‐decolonized to the realization of his-
tory. But there was a price. Encouraged to instrumentalize, for a time,
their difference from the white world that had oppressed them, the
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Black Orpheus,” tr. John MacCombie, The Massachusetts Review 6
(1964): 13-52, p. 18. Original publication: “Orphée noir,” i‐xlii in Léopold Sédar Sen-
ghor, ed., Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache de langue française (Paris:
Presses universitaires de France, 1948).
3 Sartre, “Black Orpheus,” pp. 48-49.
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black masses would, upon decolonization,melt into the (unmarked) in-
ternational working class. For Frantz Fanon, this scenario of the future
Aufhebung (dialectical sublation) of race implied the Aufhebung (cancel-
lation) of his history and identity—a grimly negative reading that saw
the cannibal qualities of Sartre’s Hegelian optimism. “When I read this
page,” said Fanon in 1952, “I sensed that my last chance was being taken
away from me.”4 A little sacrifice is demanded for the sake of the world
proletariat—very little, in the larger order of things—just an erasure of
your markedness, which as we know is in the nature of a supplement
to that regular order of things… But there is a “larger” or “regular” order
of things only from a certain perspective, and Fanon will not go along
with it. “I am not a possibility of something else, I am fully what I am.
It is not incumbent on me to pursue the universal.”5 
The next phase of the interchange, in 1961, shows Sartre admitting
in a self‐critique that Fanon was right. Reconciliation is off the table.
Only violence can express the proper (non-)relation between colonizer
and colonized.
[Africa’s] writers and its poets tried to explain to us that our values and
the true facts of their lives did not hang together, and that they could
neither reject them completely nor assimilate them. By and large,
what theywere sayingwas this: “You aremaking us intomonstrosities;
your humanism claims we are at one with the rest of humanity but
your racism sets us apart.” […]
When the peasant takes a gun in his hands, the old myths grow
dimand the prohibitions are one by one forgotten. The rebel’s weapon
is the proof of his humanity. For in the first days of the revolt youmust
kill: to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to de-
stroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time: there
4 Frantz Fanon, Peau noire, masques blancs (Paris: Seuil, 1952), p. 108. Compare the
dénouement of James Weldon Johnson’s novel Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man
(1910; reprinted, New York: Library of America, 2009), whose biracial protagonist
elects to disappear into the (unmarked) persona of “an ordinarily successful white
man who has made a little money” (p. 127).
5 Fanon, Peau noire, masques blancs, p. 109.
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remain a dead man, and a free man; the survivor, for the first time,
feels a national soil under his foot.6
This newly‐sensed “national soil” is the ground (no figure of speech!) of
an exclusive category. Sartre could not, apparently, retract the either/or
of his previous statement on negritude and human progress (the black
man’s struggles are ultimately either for black people or for humanity
in general). In 1961 he replays it: this time, it is not the black man who
vanishes as such, but the European who must be eliminated. As the
heroes of oldWesterns used to say, “There ain’t room in this town for you
and me.” He was thinking, of course, about the Algerian independence
struggle, but the language closely parallels that which Kayibanda, at the
same time, was using about his Tutsi co‐nationals.That dead European
would not be the last corpse, although Sartre was not concerned to look
so far into the future.
But in 1948 it was the occupation of time, not turf, that was decisive.
The vision of history asmoving toward the one great struggle, absorbing
into itself and obliterating the specific and thus lesser struggles of em-
pirical individuals like Frantz Fanon, had communal backing. Almost
a third of French voters had chosen the Communist ticket in 1946 and
1947, giving the PCF the largest score among all the parties. For a signif-
icant part of Sartre’s public, an exclusive, determinist and teleological
conception of history was entirely acceptable.
In answer, the appeal to history was Claude Lévi-Strauss’s opening
in 1962 for showing Sartre who was themore committed anticolonialist.
Without mentioning Fanon (who certainly read Lévi-Strauss although
it is not known if Lévi-Strauss read him), Lévi-Strauss points to Sartre’s
notions of history and dialectical thought as the ultimate authorizations
for the requirement for colonized peoples to check their identities at
the door of progress. He finds Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960)
resorting to analogies that would not have displeased the architects of
European colonization.
6 Jean-Paul Sartre, preface to Frantz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre (Paris: F. Maspero,
1961), pp. 7-8, 11.
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It appears to [Sartre] even less admissible than it was to [Lucien] Lévy-
Brühl [author ofMental Functions in Inferior Societies, 1910] that primitive
man possesses “complex knowledge” and is capable of analysis and
demonstration. About that aborigine from Ambrym,made famous by
Deacon’s description, who expounded to a questioner the functioning
of his society’smarriage rules and kinship systemby tracing a diagram
in the sand (no isolated ability, since the ethnographic literature con-
tainsmany similar observations), Sartre affirms that “it is obvious that
this construction is no act of thinking, but rather a manual execution
regulated by a synthetic consciousness that he does not express” (Cri-
tique de la raison dialectique, p. 505). If we grant him this point, we will
have to say the same of the professor at the École Polytechnique who
demonstrates a proof on the blackboard. Any ethnographer with the
knack of dialectical understandingwill be sure that the situation is ex-
actly the same in both cases.7
The faulty comparison that treats differently things that are “exactly the
same,” that primes its conclusions for inequality, gets a stinging rebuke.
A crude dualism ofmatter and thought is surely out of place in any epis-
temology that calls itself materialist, all the more when it has the result
of positing the educated European as a self‐aware subject of history and
the primitive as a mere animal or machine repeating rote gestures in
the sand. “History,” even the Marxist history of stages of class struggle
leading up to the final liberation of humanity, looks very much like an
ethnocentric Incomparable. For this reason, Lévi-Strauss finds in Sartre
an exquisite document of “the mythology of our time.” By putting the
aborigine and the engineering professor on the same plane (La pensée
sauvage had begun with an opposition, better remembered through a
thousand citations, between the “tinkerer” and the “engineer”), ethnog-
raphy “reduces” the myths and icons of our society, correcting their
self‐centeredness; and so much the better, for its aim is “not to con-
stitute the human, but to dissolve it.”8
7 Claude Lévi-Strauss, La pensée sauvage (Paris: Plon, 1962), p. 332.
8 Lévi-Strauss, La pensée sauvage, p. 326.
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“Reducing” and “dissolving” sound like purely negative operations,
and we are trained to be suspicious of “reductive” analogies. But in-
flated comparison is a vice too: so we see from Lévi-Strauss’s comple-
tion of the homology and his refusal to consider that the engineering
professor does anything different in kind than the aboriginal informant.
Did Sartre diminish the aborigine or inflate the professor? Which dy-
namic is at work will depend on one’s prior assessment of scale, an in-
herently controversial judgment from the moment one is addressing a
non‐homogeneous community; and comparison’s first task is to estab-
lish a common scale.
Because history as written by Europeans (even leftist ones) is dipped
in the dye of progress, so that our own ancestors are unable to see
eye‐to-eye with us and “primitives” are only technically our contem-
poraries, something must replace history as our means of plotting our
way through theworld.9 Theviolence of Sartrian timewas to be replaced
by the cognitive space of the lexicon, the array of classificatory systems
that constitutes the basis of La pensée sauvage’s claim for the intellectual
dignity of peoples without writing.
French structuralism is often accused of being a conspiracy against
time. In this case its motives were honorable. Lévi-Strauss had experi-
ence with the inertia of institutions, even newly‐founded ones like UN-
ESCO, in coming to grips with the changes underway under decoloniza-
tion.10 The methods he took from linguistics (decomposing sequences,
noting recurrences and exclusions, arranging elements along axes of
similarity and difference) were universalist in the double sense of (a)
being generally applicable, and (b) rejecting cultural hierarchies. They
amounted to a morphology of culture (customs, narratives, artifacts,
and so on). The evolutionary perspective dear to the later nineteenth
9 For a classic statement of the problem of ethnocentrism and history, see Johannes
Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1979).
10 On Lévi-Strauss’s engagement with UNESCO in its early years, see Emmanuelle
Loyer, Claude Lévi-Strauss (Paris: Flammarion, 2015), pp. 380-407.
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century was excluded: La pensée sauvage would chart a path back to Cu-
vier, as it were.
La pensée sauvage is a work of cheerful reductionism. Reduction,
for the Lévi-Strauss of 1962, is what comparative and interdisciplinary
research is all about: “reintegrating culture into nature, and ultimately
life into the totality of its physical and chemical conditions.”11 But
when attempting such a reduction of complex units into simpler ones,
one should not expect the categories to remain imperturbably as they
were at the outset. Guided by a proportional analogy (culture : nature
:: life : matter) previously invoked in his disagreement with Sartre,
Lévi-Strauss remarks that
we must anticipate that every reduction [of a part to a larger whole]
will utterly reverse the preconceived idea that one might have had of
the level—whatever it be—that one was aiming at. The idea of a com-
prehensive humanity, toward which ethnographic reduction leads,
will have nothing in common with the idea one had of it beforehand.
And when the day comes that we manage to understand life as a
function of inert matter, we are sure to discover that the properties of
matter are quite other than those we were accustomed to assign it.12
Whatever else Lévi-Strausswas doing in this sketch of the final consum-
mation of the disciplines, he gives here a good account of the reflective
comparison—the kind where the things compared cause a modifica-
tion in the framework, categories, and criteria of comparison, and the
comparer learns something.
Consider that ambitious sketch as a program of translation. Sup-
posing that we were able to translate all true statements about culture
into differently (and less provincially) true statements about nature,
11 Lévi-Strauss, La pensée sauvage, p. 327.
12 Lévi-Strauss, La pensée sauvage, p. 327. “Reduction” may be ill‐named; “integration”
might have been more appropriate. Compare the use of “integration” as a name
for the mapping of forms onto meanings in the roughly contemporary essay by
Émile Benveniste, “Les niveaux de l’analyse linguistique,” in Problèmes de linguis-
tique générale (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), pp. 127-31.
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all true statements about life into true (and less vitalistically mystify-
ing) statements about matter, all true statements about mental states
into true (and experimentally grounded) statements about the brain:
would this have meant that the language used to describe nature, mat-
ter, and the brain was unaffected, and simply waited in its majestic
disciplinary self‐assurance for the half‐coherent subjective utterances
to be disposed of by the translation‐process, or would there necessarily
be some push and pull whereby the meanings of the materialistic lan-
guage took on new properties through their having accommodated the
previous non‐materialistic languages?13 To see the translation of spirit
intomatter as one‐way is to say that the person possessing the right lan-
guage will never have anything more to learn.Those who look closely at
the zones and events where spirit and matter meet have found repeat-
edly over the centuries that the neat boundaries break down as language
warps to accommodate ambiguous observations.14
Sartre’s 1948 schema made no room for Fanon as he was, or for
Sartre to learn anything from the black poets that he did not already, as
prophet of history, know; even after several meetings with Fanon, his
1961 daydream of anticolonial violence only dramatized the static char-
acter of his categories. Likewise, “history” as it can be imagined by a Eu-
ropean thinker in the age of colonization will have only a tangential re-
13 For the application of the model of translation to this problem, see Edgar Wilson,
TheMental as Physical (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979).
14 The antinomybetween freewill anddeterminism inKant’sCritique of PureReason is
well known. Common sense represents any gain in the power of determinism as a
loss for freewill and vice versa: suchwas the framing of Benjamin Libet’s studies of
decision sequences in Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005). A later examination of the problem refor-
mulates voluntary action in terms of “capacity,” “skills and cognitive functions that
do not necessarily imply a continuous conscious control over the decision‐mak-
ing and action process”: this amounts to redrawing the boundary as a zone of in-
termingling. See Andrea Lavazza, “Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining
Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It,” Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience 10 (2016), article 262, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC4887467/pdf/fnhum-10-00262.pdf (accessed February 24,
2019).
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lation to “history” as it will appear once colonized peoples take up their
rightful position in it. And indeed themeaning of “history” has changed
since 1962. Explorations of the rhetoric of history‐writing, attempts to
write “history from below,” returns to the archive, and a pluralization of
communal memories and narratives leave only a few stubborn dogma-
tists and one‐party states in a position to tell us what “history says.”15
History now speaks in many tongues and guises, including conspiracy,
counter‐history and fan‐fiction; its lessons are many and inconsistent.
It should be obvious to us now that “history” and “humanity” should
not have functioned as toll stations but as ongoing projects to which a
young psychiatrist from Martinique had much to offer, “not only as a
possibility of something else” but as he was.
That space should have offered a refuge from the exclusivism of time
is understandable. But the earth (though big and round) is finite. Hu-
man attention is finite. Platforms for political representation are lim-
ited. A democratic and diverse culture must figure out how to make
room. Lévi-Strauss’s imagined solution to the problem of making room
for difference was to emulate the infinitely subdivisible architecture of
human languages. Or of biological classification: botanists do not worry
about running out of species names, they worry about the species go-
ing extinct before they can be catalogued. (See above, on the earth being
finite.) The art of making room, in this sense of “room”, is not depen-
dent on the beneficence of those already occupying space, who might
accommodate the latecomers. Nor is it a matter of packing existing vol-
umes more tightly. Making room for difference requires adding to the
recognized dimensions when possible, and when not, imagining some-
thing better than either/or, zero‐sum solutions. Pushing the others out
is a strategy for societies that can allow only so much difference and
15 For analyses of history as a formofwriting, see for exampleHaydenWhite,Metahis-
tory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Michel de Certeau, L’Écrit-
ure de l’histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1975); Frank Ankersmit,Narrative Logic: A Semantic
Analysis of the Historian’s Language (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983). In 1990, the Moscow
high schools suspended the annual Russian history exam. There were too many
versions of history circulating for the teachers to feel authorized to pass judgment
on the papers (Olga Solovieva, personal recollection).
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no more: societies that insist on robbing Peter to pay Paul, on making
revenge the prototype of justice and sacrifice the condition of progress.
One thing that comparison, particularly the reflective kind, can do is
make alternatives appear. Out of two different things it makes a third,
with no additional inputs of matter or energy. Trade‐offs are the hall-
mark of the finite imagination, of a politics that rejoices in limits, in
making people into winners and losers, in keeping things as they are.
It is urgent in confronting such imaginaries that there be something to
compare themwith: only then can we paint a margin around world‐pic-
tures presented as irrefutable.
Envoi
Perhaps comparison is, as Karl Kraus said of psychoanalysis, “the men-
tal illness that it claims to cure.”1 But there is no going back. What
is wrong with a misconceived or misleading comparison that a bet-
ter comparison cannot put right? By “better” I mean: wider, more pre-
cisely formulated, attentive to more confounding factors or selection
biases, able to withstand translation into more other languages, times
or fields of reference. Among the preconditions of better comparison
are such common‐sense social goods as availability of information (in
the case of literary comparison, this will require learning the necessary
languages), unfettered debate, an assortment of rival definitions for key
terms, and skilled interlocutors. I have collected the above instances of
comparison in a comparative spirit, looking for examples of instructive
failure or insight. Condemned to compare, living amid a polarized state
of discourse that responds to every piece of news with an ideologically
oppositely‐charged piece of news, we can and must learn from such ex-
periences as these how to design our experiments in comparison so as
to cut Incomparables down to size, keep our categories reflexive, know
which universe of comparison we are in moment by moment, antici-
pate discrepant audiences, be alert to collisions between example and
framework, and set comparison’s implicit appeals to justice within the
widest available bounds.
To do our comparingmorewisely, less destructively, less invidiously,
is a worthwhile aim.The skill that comparison gives us “not only to own,
1 “Psychoanalyse ist jene Geisteskrankheit, für deren Therapie sie sich hält.” Karl
Kraus, Nachts (Leipzig: Kurt Wolff, 1918), p. 72.
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but to feel the power of prejudices” is an epistemology and an ethics,
and is never done with. But best practices and regulative ideas speak
only to those who have already accepted the principle of guidance. The
main usefulness of these recommendations then may be to offer means
of challengingmyopic or coercive comparisons, a challenge that, I think
the examples have shown, is ever more necessary.
So: are we comparing yet?
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